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Abstract
The thesis addresses three issues related to endogenous discounting, habits in
consumption and consumption externalities. In the first chapter, we build a model
where the discount rate is endogenous and the production function is able to
deliver endogenous growth. We show that with a utility function restricted to take
positive values, the model generates an optimal path in accordance with empirical
evidence concerning the positive correlation between increasing savings and
growth rates, the twin-peaks of economic growth as well as the existence of
growth miracles and disasters. In the second chapter, we study a model where
agents possess habits in consumption and care about environmental quality.
We show that the competitive equilibrium can be characterized by endogenous
fluctuations implying the breakdown of different sustainability criteria. Short-run
fluctuations can also be present in the optimal case suggesting that we can solve
for environmental externalities but not for the s...
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Introduction
Most models in macroeconomic and growth theory rely on a set of standards as-
sumptions concerning intertemporal preferences. Two fundamental ones are the as-
sumption of a constant utility discount rate and a utility function separable across
time and generations. Even thought, these are common assumptions in growth mod-
els, they are also particularly restrictive. In the present work, our objective is to
study three theoretical models where intertemporal preferences play a larger role
than in standard frameworks. We study two distinct ways to extend intertemporal
preferences. The first one is through the endogenization of the utility discount rate
while the other is trough the inclusion of habits in the utility function. Concerning
endogenous discounting, two strand of the literature can be identified. The first one
suggests that the discount rate should depend on some variable under the control of
the agent such as individual capital or consumption. We can for example imagine
that richer individuals (owning an important capital stock) can afford to be more
patient than poorer ones or that high consumption levels induce economic agents to
further increase consumption suggesting a kind of addiction mechanism. A different
approach suggests that social variables that are not under the control of the agent
might influence the way in which economic agents value future outcomes. An in-
tuitive way to introduce social variables is through external effects such as average
consumption or average capital holdings. In this case, the surrounding environ-
ment plays an important role on the way economic agents perceive future events.
Moreover, the introduction of external effects opens the door to the possibility of
welfare improvements through public policy. Concerning the introduction of habits
in the utility function, these can be introduced under different forms. Habits can be
formed with respect to past individual behavior or with respect to the surrounding
environment. If we focus on habits in consumption, agents will evaluate consump-
tion against a frame of reference, which can be their own past consumption, the
average consumption of the economy or the consumption level of past generations.
In the present work, we will in turn explore some of these possibilities by introducing
extended intertemporal preferences in different growth models.
In Chapter 1, we focus on an extension of the neoclassical growth model where
the discount rate is endogenous and decreasing in capital accumulation while the
production function is compatible with perfect competition, decreasing interest rates
and endogenous growth. After showing that such a model should always restrict the
utility function to the positive domain, we derive appropriate sufficiency conditions
v
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ensuring the optimality of our dynamic path. We then choose our functional forms
concerning the discount and the production function in accordance before proceeding
with the dynamic analysis. The model is able to generate multiple equilibria with
the existence of two steady states and one asymptotic balanced growth path. The
first steady state is saddle-path stable and thus equivalent to a poverty trap while
the second is unstable. In the long run, economies will converge toward the poverty
trap or the asymptotic balanced growth path. This is consistent with the empiri-
cal evidence concerning the twin-peaks of economic growth. Concerning economies
converging toward the asymptotic balanced growth path, we also obtain a positive
correlation between increasing savings and growth rates as documented empirically.
Finally, in this simple framework, it is possible that sufficiently large productivity
shocks allow a given economy to escape the poverty trap thus suggesting the possi-
bility of growth miracles and disasters. The opposite effects that decreasing interest
and discount rates have on capital accumulation explain most of the results in this
work.
In Chapter 2, we study an overlapping generation model with habits in consump-
tion and the presence of environmental quality in the utility function. The modeling
of habits implies that the representative adult compares present consumption with
the one of his childhood (assumed to be equivalent to the one of his parents). Our
main objective is to study the sustainability of such an economy where intergenera-
tional externalities are present. Following the literature, we consider that sustainable
growth paths should ensure non-decreasing utility or at least bounded below utility.
We first notice that the competitive steady-state capital stock can be higher or lower
compared to the standard Diamond framework. Concerning transitional dynamics,
the presence of habits and environmental quality can possibly generate oscillatory
behavior implying the breakdown of accepted sustainability criteria. The study of
the optimal outcome shows that the latter can still be characterized by short run
fluctuations even in the no-discounting case suggesting that we can solve for the
environmental externalities but not the sustainability problem if we stick to a stan-
dard welfare function without any sustainability constraint. Concerning the optimal
policy, given the direct link between capital and environmental quality, it might be
necessary to tax investment. This goes against the policy adopted when environ-
mental quality is not present and where investment should always be subsidized.
In Chapter 3, we focus once again on an extension of the neoclassical growth model.
As before, the discount rate is decreasing in capital accumulation but we also intro-
duce external effects driven by average consumption. In this case, the latter can be
seen as a proxy for an economy’s living standards and affect the discount rate as
well as the production function. In the first case, following empirical evidence show-
ing that individuals tend to compare their income or consumption levels with the
one of their surrounding environment; we assume that the discount rate is actually
increasing in average consumption. In the second case, we suppose that individ-
ual productivities can be positively affected by standards of living (for example
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through the access to better health and nutrition standards) implying that con-
sumption might enhance capital accumulation contrary to the standard framework.
The model is able to generate multiple equilibria under fairly general conditions
concerning the discount and the production function. On the dynamic side, local
indeterminacy implying the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria is only possi-
ble when discounting externalities are present. In order to obtain a unique steady
state, which is also indeterminate, it is necessary to combine sufficiently large pro-
duction and discounting externalities. Given the presence of consumption in the
production function, under some restrictions concerning the discount, the utility
and the production function, unbounded growth is also a possible outcome of the
model. In that case, we obtain a unique balanced growth path, which is always
indeterminate. Finally, concerning the optimal outcome, while saddle-path stability
prevails on the dynamic side, the magnitude of both kind of externalities is crucial
in order to determine of consumption should be taxed or subsidized.
viii INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
Endogenous discounting and
economic development
1.1 Introduction
The debates about discounting have a long history in economic growth theory even
though standard models usually assume a positive and constant utility discount
rate. This assumption is mostly used for analytical convenience rather than based
on strong economic intuition. Authors such as Ramsey (1928) and Harrod (1948)
were already against this practice and in favor of a zero rate of discount based on
ethical arguments. More recently, several economists have started to focus on the
possibility of an endogenous discount rate. Different approaches can be identified
in this literature. A first one relies on so called social variables which are not un-
der the control of the representative agent. This is the case in works such as Shi
(1999) where the discount rate depends on average consumption, in Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2003) where average utility impacts the discount rate or in Meng (2006)
where the discount rate is a function of both average consumption and income. A
second approach mixes these social variables with private ones under the control of
the agent. Drugeon (1998) combines individual and average consumption, Drugeon
(1996a) and Palivos and al (1997) combine individual consumption with average
capital holdings while Yanase (2011) combines individual consumption with total
pollution. Finally, a last approach which will be the one followed in this paper
relies uniquely on individual variables under the control of the agent. We can cite
as examples the work of Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2007) where the discount
rate depends on environmental variables, the ones of Uzawa (1968), Obstfeld (1990),
Drugeon (1996b) and Das (2003) where the focus is on individual consumption or
the work of Schumacher (2009, 2011) and Strulik (2012) where the discount rate is
a function of the individual capital stock.
The objective of the present paper is to introduce endogenous discounting in a
standard model of economic growth in order to shed light on some important facts
concerning the growth process. A very similar attempt has been made by Strulik
(2012) who develops a model with a discount rate decreasing in capital and a produc-
1
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tion function delivering both a decreasing interest rate and endogenous growth. The
main result of the paper is the ability of the model to generate a positive correlation
between increasing saving and growth rates as observed empirically. However, in his
numerical simulations, Strulik restricts the utility function to take negative values.
As explained in Schumacher (2011), in endogenous discounting models, the sign of
the utility function matters and can reverse the results. In particular, as we will see,
with a discount rate decreasing in capital, a negative utility function implies that
intertemporal welfare is actually decreasing in capital which goes against economic
intuition. In the present paper, we postulate a utility function that can only take
positive values. This leads us to the breakdown of the standard Mangasarian second
order conditions which require a negative utility function. We thus derive appro-
priate second order conditions and choose our functional forms in accordance. This
allows us to build a model in line with three fundamental observations concerning
the growth process:
1) The joint observation that there exist a positive correlation between increasing
saving and growth rates and at the same time a decrease in the interest rate is in
opposition with the standard Ramsey model.
2) Most empirical observations have confirmed that the discount rate is not constant
but actually decreasing in wealth accumulation.
3) The world distribution of income has been changing from an approximately nor-
mal distribution toward a bimodal one with both growth miracles and disasters.
In this paper, we show that a discount rate decreasing in capital coupled with a
standard endogenous growth model might reconcile these stylized facts with theory.
The choice of capital as the discount rate variable is mostly driven by empirical
evidence. Capital can directly be related to wealth accumulation which in turn is
positively correlated with lower mortality rates and thus lower discount rates (Field-
ling and al. 2009). Moreover, authors such as Lawrence (1991) and Samwick (1998)
have found that the discount rate is decreasing in capital and wealth in panel data
analysis.
Most of the endogenous discounting litterature of this type focuses on exogenous
growth through the use of a neoclassical production function (notable exceptions
are the works of Drugeon 1996b and Strulik 2012). This is a clear impediment to
reproduce a positive correlation between increasing saving and growth rates since
convergence toward steady-state equilibrium is in opposition with the possibility of
increasing growth rates. Our objective is thus to combine this endogenous discount-
ing framework with a production function ensuring perfect competition and deliver-
ing endogenous growth. We prefer to maintain the perfect competition assumption
in order to highlight the main effect due to endogenous discounting. In order to do
so, as in Strulik (2012), we choose to refer to the work of Jones and Manuelli (1990)
who propose a production function combining an AK and a neoclassical part. This
production function will allow us to benefit from both the convergence effect of the
neoclassical production function as well as from the long run properties of the AK
model. The marginal productivity of capital being decreasing in this case, we are
able to study the opposite effects of capital accumulation on the discount and the
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interest rate.
A brief account of the results is as follows. We first argue that the utility function
should only take positive values and derive appropriate sufficiency conditions and
specific functional forms in accordance with this assumption. We then derive a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the existence of an asymptotic balanced growth
path equilibrium involving restrictions on the elasticity of marginal utility. The pos-
sible existence of two steady-state equilibria of stagnation is then studied. The one
with the lowest capital level being locally stable and thus equivalent to a poverty
trap while the second being unstable defines the frontier between convergence toward
the poverty trap or the asymptotic balanced growth path. The positive correlation
between increasing growth and saving rates is confirmed for an economy converg-
ing toward the asymptotic balanced growth path. Concerning growth miracles and
disasters, these are made possible trough exogenous shocks on the productivity pa-
rameter. We use this mechanism more as an example then an actual way for a
country to escape a poverty trap. The main driving force behind the results seems
to be due to the fact that the discount rate effect always dominates the interest rate
one as capital accumulation proceeds.
The structure of the paper is the following: section 2 introduces the model and
derives appropriate sufficient conditions in the case of a utility function taking only
positive values. The different equilibria of this economy are studied in section 3
while section 4 focuses on transitional dynamics. Section 5 confronts the model
to fundamental stylized facts concerning the growth process and section 6 finally
concludes.
1.2 The model
The model is based on a representative infinitely-lived agent who maximizes con-
sumption subject to capital accumulation. The latter is made possible trough in-
vestment and reduced by consumption and constant depreciation of capital. The
discount rate is endogenous and depends on the historical path of capital per capita.
Furthermore, population is constant and normalized to one. The intertemporal dis-
counted utility function is given by:
U(c(t), {k(t)}t0) =
∫ ∞
0
u(c(t))e−θtdt (1.1)
The discount rate θ(t) > 0 depends on past and current levels of capital per capita
in the following way:
θ(t) =
∫ t
0
ρ(k(s))ds (1.2)
Assumption 1:
The utility function is twice continuously differentiable and has the following prop-
erties: u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0 and limc→0 u′(c) = ∞. The last property implies that
a positive amount of consumption is needed at the optimum. Mathematically, it
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guarantees an interior solution. In the forthcoming analysis, we will use a constant
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) utility function which will take the
following functional form:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ (1.3)
with σ ≥ 0 representing the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The discount function is twice continuously differentiable and has the following the
following properties: ρ′(k) < 0 and ρ′′(k) > 0. The discount rate is thus decreas-
ing in capital accumulation implying that richer individuals are more patient than
poorer ones. For the moment, we don’t specify a particular function concerning the
discount rate.
Before proceeding, we should focus on the importance of the sign of the utility
function in endogenous discounting models. In the present case, preferences being
recursive, a change in the capital stock will not only have an impact on present
utility but also on the way the representative agent perceives future utility levels.
In order to compute the marginal utilities, we will rely on the Volterra derivatives
with respect to consumption and capital. The Volterra derivative gives the rate at
which intertemporal utility changes with respect to a small increase in consumption
or capital near a given time t. In the present case, we obtain:
Utc = u
′(c(t))e−
∫ t
0
ρ(k(s))ds (1.4)
Utk = −ρ′(k(s))e−
∫ t
0
ρ(k(s))ds
∫ ∞
t
u(c(s))e−
∫ s
t
ρ(k(τ))dτds (1.5)
It can be observed that the Volterra derivative with respect to consumption is always
positive while the one with respect to capital is negative if u(c) < 0 and positive
if u(c) > 0. This suggest that in the case of negative utility a higher capital level
decreases intertemporal welfare. Subsequently, a higher discount rate can be seen
as something good in the sense that it increases total welfare. The lack of economic
intuition given by these results suggest that in the present framework, we should use
a utility function that can only take positive values as stated in Schumacher (2011).
Note that this is not a more general statement and that the choice of the sign of
the utility function should always be based on the respective Volterra derivatives of
each model.
In a similar framework, Strulik (2012) does not seem to take into account this
observation and proceeds with a utility function taking negative values by assuming
a CIES utility function with an elasticity of marginal utility equal to 2 for his
numerical simulations.
If we choose to proceed with a utility function that only take positive values, a
different kind of problem arises. In the case of negative utility, the Mangasarian
sufficiency conditions are equivalent to u(c) < 0 so that they are always satisfied.
However, in the case of positive utility, this is not anymore the case and specific
sufficiency conditions should be derived. We thus proceed with our CIES utility
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function where σ < 1 and derive the appropriate sufficiency conditions.
Our optimization problem can be written in the following way:
max
c(t),k(t)
∫ ∞
0
u(c(t))e−
∫ t
0
ρ(k(s))dsdt (1.6)
subject to 
˙k(t) = f(k(t))− c(t)− δk(t) ∀t
k(t) ≥ 0, c(t) ≥ 0 ∀t
with k(0) given
As dθ
dt
= ρ(k(t)), we can write dt = dθ
ρ(k(t))
and obtain the following Hamiltonian 1:
H∆ = c
1−σe−θ
(1− σ)ρ(k) + λ
(
f(k)− c− δk
ρ(k)
)
(1.7)
The first order condition for the control variable is given by:
c−σe−θ = λ (1.8)
Let’s rewrite c =
(
e−θ
λ
)1/σ
and substitute this in the Hamiltonian in order to obtain
the Hamiltonian along the optimal path. Now let’s take second-order conditions
with respect to k to see if the Hamiltonian is indeed concave along the optimal
path. The first-order condition is given by
∂H∆
∂k
= λ
(
f ′(k)− δ
ρ(k)
)
(1.9)
−
 c1−σ1− σe−θ + λ[f(k)−
(
e−θ
λ
)1/σ
− δk]
 ρ′(k)ρ(k)2
while the second-order condition is given by
∂2H∆
∂k2
= −H
(
ρ′′(k)
ρ(k)
− 2ρ
′(k)2
ρ(k)2
)
+ λ
f ′′(k)
ρ(k)
(1.10)
−2ρ′(k)λ
(
f ′(k)− δ
ρ(k)2
)
Since H∆ > 0, the Hamiltonian is concave if the following two conditions are re-
spected:
ρ′′(k) > 2
ρ′(k)2
ρ(k)
f ′′(k) < 2ρ′(k)
f ′(k)− δ
ρ(k)
1From now on, we drop the time dependency for convenience.
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In order to see the implications of these two conditions we apply them to the func-
tional forms choosen by Strulik (2012). At first Strulik proposes an AK produc-
tion function such that f(k) = Ak coupled with the following discount function
ρ(k) = ρ+ ρ0k
−η. In this case, the first sufficiency condition is equivalent to:
η(η + 1)ρ0k
−η−2 > 2
(ηρ0)
2k−2η−2
ρ+ ρ0k−η
(1.11)
k >
[
(η − 1)ρ0
(η + 1)ρ
] 1
η
(1.12)
such that if η < 1 this condition is always satisfied. This is indeed the case in
Strulik’s paper since for his numerical simulations η is set to 0.33 or 0.35.
The second condition is equivalent to:
2ηρ0k
−η−1(A− δ) < 0 (1.13)
which is never satisfied given the value of the parameters. The second condition
in fact requires a sufficient degree of concavity concerning the production function
such that we cannot adopt an AK production function which is linear in capital and
still be sure to respect the second-order conditions in the case of positive utility.
Strulik then studies what he calls the full model where the production function be-
comes f(k) = Ak+Bkα and the discount function is still the same. This production
function is drawn from Jones and Manuelli (1990) and delivers both a decreasing
interest rate and endogenous growth. The first condition is not affected and the
second becomes:
ρ+ ρ0k
−η >
2ηρ0k
−η−1
Bα(1− α)kα−2 (A+Bαk
α−1 − δ) (1.14)
(1− α− 2η)ρ0
kη
>
(A− δ)2ηρ0k1−η−α
Bα
− (1− α)ρ (1.15)
Given that 1 − α − η > 0, since α is set around 0.33 and η around 0.33 or 0.35
in Strulik’s numerical simulations, for large values of k, this condition will not be
fulfilled and we cannot ensure that the second-order conditions are indeed satisfied
if we consider a utility function taking only positive values. It thus seems necessary
to modify the production function or the discount function. In the present case, we
will focus on the discount function since our objective is to keep a relatively simple
production function exhibiting a decreasing interest rate and delivering endogenous
growth.
We propose a discount function of the following form ρ(k) = ρ + ρ0e
−βkγ . In this
case the sufficiency conditions are given by:
(
ρ0 + ρe
βkγ
)(
1 +
1− γ
γβkγ
)
> 2ρ0 (1.16)
Bα[(1− α)(ρ0 + ρeβkγ )− 2βγρ0kγ]
k1+γ−α
> 2βγρ0(A− δ) (1.17)
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Concerning the first condition, we can see that the limit of the left hand side of
expression (1.16) when k → 0 is ∞ if γ < 1 while when k → ∞, the limit is ∞.
We thus choose to impose γ < 1 in our discount function such that the condition is
satisfied for low and high values of the capital stock. However, we wish to ensure
that the condition is satisfied for all values of the capital stock. A sufficient condition
for this requirement to be satisfied is that the ratio (1− γ)ρeβkγ/γβkγ is increasing
in k. This is indeed the case if
k >
(
1
β
) 1
γ
(1.18)
such that we will restrict the forthcoming analysis to values of k which respect this
constraint. This implies that β should be large enough in order to avoid large re-
strictions on the capital stock. We thus impose that β > 1.
Concerning expression (1.17), the limit of the left hand side is ∞ both when k → 0
and when k → ∞. The latter result can be obtained by applying several times
l’Hospital’s rule. We can also see that the numerator of expression (1.17) is actually
increasing in k such that the second condition will be more easily satisfied for larger
values of the capital stock. These results allows us to use the discount function
suggested above so that we can proceed with the analysis in this case.
Assumption 2:
As stated before, the production function is the same as in the full model of Strulik
(2012) and drawn from Jones and Manuelli (1990). It takes the following form:
F (K,L) = AK +BKαL1−α
with an AK as well as a Cobb-Douglas part. In intensive form, f(k) = Ak+Bkα and
this function follows all the standard assumptions on concavity, such that f(0) =
0, f ′(k) > 0, f ′′(k) < 0.
The production function is not neoclassical only because it violates one of the Inada
conditions: limk→∞ f ′(k) = A > 0, in the long run, the marginal productivity of
capital is bounded away from zero. Moreover this production function still exhibits
a decreasing interest rate.
The discount function is given by
ρ(k) = ρ+ ρ0e
−βkγ
with γ < 1 and ρ ≥ 0. Concerning the minimal discount rate ρ, both a zero or a
positive value can be considered. We can imagine that very rich agents can afford
not to discount future utilities as well as that individuals will always discount the
future because of reasons such as the difficulty to value future enjoyments (see for
example Becker and Mulligan 1997), the fact that there is always a relative prefer-
ence for the present or the possibility of death or exctinction (Stern 2007).
We can now proceed with the analysis of the model. Given that we want to compare
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the implications of our model with stylized facts, we recast the problem as an equi-
librium one. Individuals supply one unit of labor and receive a wage w and capital
income net of depreciation (r − δ)k where r is the interest rate. Income is spent on
consumption and investment such that we obtain the following budget constraint:
k˙t = (r − δ)k + w − c− δk (1.19)
Given our production function, the interest rate and the wage are given by r =
A + Bαkα−1 and w = (1 − α)Bkα. Moreover by taking the derivative of equation
(1.2) with respect to time we obtain:
θ˙ = ρ+ ρ0e
−βkγ (1.20)
which can be used as a second state variable concerning the evolution of the discount
rate. The representative agent then solves the following problem:
max
c,k
∫ ∞
0
u(c)e−θdt (1.21)
subject to 
k˙ = (r − δ)k + w − c ∀t
θ˙ = ρ+ ρ0e
−βkγ ∀t
k(0) >
(
1
β
) 1
γ , c ≥ 0 ∀t
with k(0) given
We write the present value Hamiltonian of the above system:
H = c
1−σ
1− σe
−θ + λ[(r − δ)k + w − c]− µ(ρ+ ρ0e−βkγ ) (1.22)
The first order necessary conditions for optimality are:
c−σe−θ = λ (1.23)
λ(r − δ)k + βµγkγ−1ρ0e−βkγ = −λ˙ (1.24)
− c
1−σ
1− σe
−θ = µ˙ (1.25)
lim
t→∞H(t) = 0 (1.26)
As explained in Michel (1982), the transversality condition is modified in infinite
horizon problems and the appropriate one is given by expression (1.26).
By solving the model and using the equilibrium values for r and w, we obtain the
following dynamical system:
c˙
c
=
A+Bαkα−1 − δ − ρ− ρ0e−βkγ
σ
+
µγβcσkγ−1ρ0e−βk
γ
σe−θ
(1.27)
k˙ = Ak +Bkα − c− δk (1.28)
µ˙ = − c
1−σ
1− σe
−θ (1.29)
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Lemma 1:
The previous dynamical system can be reduced to the following planar system:
c˙
c
=
A+Bαkα−1 − δ − ρ− ρ0e−βkγ
σ
(1.30)
+
[(1− σ)(Ak +Bkα − δk) + σc]γβkγ−1ρ0e−βkγ
σ(1− σ)(ρ+ ρ0e−βkγ )
k˙
k
= A+Bkα−1 − c
k
− δ (1.31)
Proof. First note that the Hamiltonian is autonomous. Differentiating the Hamil-
tonian with respect to time we obtain:
dH
dt
=
∂H
∂t
+
∂H
∂c
c˙+
∂H
∂k
k˙ +
∂H
∂θ
θ˙ +
∂H
∂λ
λ˙− ∂H
∂µ
µ˙ (1.32)
Using the first order conditions for optimality:
dH
dt
=
∂H
∂t
− λ˙k˙ + k˙λ˙+ µ˙θ˙ − θ˙µ˙ (1.33)
dH
dt
=
∂H
∂t
(1.34)
Since the Hamiltonian is autonomous, ∂H
∂t
= 0. Combining this result with the
transversality condition, limt→∞H(t) = 0, implies that the Hamiltonian takes the
value zero along the optimal trajectory.
We now have a solution for µ by transforming the Hamiltonian:
µ =
c−σe−θ[c+ (1− σ)k˙]
(1− σ)(ρ+ ρ0e−βkγ ) (1.35)
Replacing µ by its value in the differential equation for consumption and dividing
the capital equation by k yields the desired result.
Equations (1.30) and (1.31) capture the dynamics of our economy. The capital
accumulation equation is standard while the consumption equation can be separated
into two terms. The first one is similar to a standard neoclassical accumulation
equation where the depreciation and the discount rates are substracted from the
marginal productivity of capital. The second is a positive term taking into account
the effect of a decreasing discount rate on the growth rate of consumption through
an expression involving the shadow value of the discount rate.
1.3 Equilibria
We have two kind of equilibria in this economy. The first one is the balanced growth
path equilibrium (BGP) where consumption, output and capital grow without bound
at a common positive constant rate while the other is the steady-state equilibrium
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where the growth rates of consumption, output and capital are equal to zero. We
first focus on the BGP equilibrium. As it has been proved in Palivos, Wang and
Zhang (1997), a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a BGP is that
the elasticity of marginal utility and the discount rate be constant along this path.
This is not the case in our model since the discount rate is endogenous. Neverthe-
less, we can apply the concept of an asymptotically balanced growth path (ABGP)
to our problem.
Definition 1:
An ABGP equilibrium of this economy is a solution (ct, kt) to equations (1.30) and
(1.31) given k(0), such that limc→∞ gc = limk→∞ gk = limk→∞ gf > 0, where g rep-
resents the constant growth rate of the respective endogenous variables.
In order to draw some conclusions from the ABGP, the usual method is to op-
erate on variables which are constant along the ABGP. From equation (1.31), we
know that a constant growth rate for capital obtains if z = f(k)
k
= A + Bkα−1 and
x = c
k
are constant. x is the consumption to capital ratio while z is the output to
capital ratio. Equation (1.31) also implies the equality of the limiting growth rates
given in the definition of the ABGP.
We first determine the differential equation for z:
z = A+Bkα−1 (1.36)
z˙ = (α− 1)Bkα−1 k˙
k
(1.37)
z˙ = (α− 1)(z − A)(z − x− δ) (1.38)
with z(0) given.
We now determine the differential equation for x:
x˙
x
=
c˙
c
− k˙
k
(1.39)
x˙
x
=
1− σ
σ
(A− δ) + (z − A)α− σ
σ
+ x− ρ+ ρ0e
−βkγ
σ
(1.40)
+
[(1− σ)(z − δ) + σx]γβkγρ0e−βkγ
σ(1− σ)(ρ+ ρ0e−βkγ )
Proposition 1:
An ABGP such that limk→∞ z˙ = limk→∞ x˙ = 0 exists if ρ > 0 and if and only if
1 > σ > 1− ρ
A−δ . Furthermore, this equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
Proof. Concerning z, we can see from equation (1.36) that z − A converges to zero
as capital grows unboundedly thus limk→∞ z˙ = 0.
Concerning x, the limit of equation (1.40) is not defined since kγ grows unboundedly
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while e−βk
γ
converges to zero. A slight modification of the numerator of the last
term gives:
lim
k→∞
[(1− σ)(z − δ) + σx]γβkγρ0e−βk = lim
k→∞
F
kγ
eβkγ
(1.41)
where F is a constant. Making use of l’Hospital’s rule:
lim
k→∞
kγ
eβkγ
= lim
k→∞
1
βeβkγ
= 0 (1.42)
lim
k→∞
F
kγ
eβkγ
= 0 (1.43)
Since the limit of the denominator of the last term in expression (1.40) is a constant
equal to σ(1− σ)ρ, we can conclude that limk→∞ x˙ exists and is finite.
From equations (1.38) and (1.40), we obtain:
lim
k→∞
z˙ = lim
k→∞
(α− 1)(z − A)(z − x− δ) (1.44)
lim
k→∞
x˙ = {1− σ
σ
(A− δ) + lim
k→∞
[(z − A)α− σ
σ
+ x]− ρ
σ
} lim
k→∞
x (1.45)
Setting the two previous equations to zero such that the limiting growth rates of
consumption, capital and output are equal, we obtain:
lim
k→∞
x =
ρ+ (σ − 1)(A− δ)
σ
(1.46)
lim
k→∞
z = A (1.47)
Expression (1.46) must be positive for an ABGP to exist. This condition is equiva-
lent to:
1 > σ > 1− ρ
A− δ (1.48)
The elasticity of marginal utility is thus bounded above by one by assumption and
below by the preceding condition. From this same condition, we can directly con-
clude that ρ > 0 is a necessary condition for the existence of an ABGP since by
assumption σ < 1.
Assuming that condition (1.48) is satisfied, we study the local stability of the system
around the asymptotic steady-state. In order to realize this task, we compute the
Jacobian matrix at (limk→∞ x, limk→∞ z). As can be seen from equations (1.38) and
(1.40), the Jacobian matrix will be continuous in x and z such that we are able to
take first the limit and then the derivative in order to get rid of the terms depending
on k in equation (1.40). We thus use equations (1.44) and (1.45) to compute the
Jacobian matrix and obtain:
J =
[
ρ+(σ−1)(A−δ)
σ
(α−σ)(ρ+(σ−1)(A−δ))
σ2
0 (α− 1)A−δ−ρ
σ
]
(1.49)
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The system is saddle-path stable if we have one positive and one negative eigen-
value. We denote λ1 and λ2 the two eigenvalues and we have to prove that the
determinant is negative. In this case, the computation is straightforward since we
have a triangular matrix:
Det(J) =
ρ+ (σ − 1)(A− δ)
σ
(α− 1)A− δ − ρ
σ
(1.50)
We can see from expression (1.46) that the existence of the ABGP implies that
the first eigenvalue is positive. We can also impose that A − δ − ρ > 0 which is a
standard assumption in the endogenous growth literature (this implies that the long
term interest rate is higher than the sum of capital depreciation and the minimal
discount rate) in order to ensure long-term growth. Moreover, the share of capital
in the neoclassical part of the production function is lower than one such that the
second eigenvalue is negative. The determinant is thus negative and the system is
saddle-path stable. This completes the second part of the proof.
Before proceeding, the reader should notice that contrary to the case with a
negative utility function used by Strulik (2012), the restriction needed to ensure the
existence of a ABGP plays an important role by fixing boundaries for the elasticity
of marginal utility and showing the need of a positive minimal discount rate. In the
case, of negative utility, since σ > 1, the parameter restrictions do not play any role
concerning the existence of an ABGP equilibrium.
From the previous results we can now compute the asymptotically growth rates of
ct, kt, f(kt) and confirm that they are equal without any parameter restriction.
lim
k→∞
c˙
c
= lim
k→∞
A+Bαkα−1 − δ − ρ− ρ0e−βkγ
σ
(1.51)
+ lim
k→∞
[c+ (1− σ)k˙]γβkγ−1ρ0e−βkγ
σ(1− σ)(ρ+ ρ0e−βkγ )
lim
k→∞
c˙
c
=
A− δ − ρ
σ
(1.52)
The change from equation (1.51) to (1.52) is a direct consequence of the proof of
Proposition 1 where we see that the second term in equation (1.51) converges to
zero.
lim
k→∞
k˙
k
= lim
t→∞ z − limt→∞x− δ (1.53)
lim
k→∞
k˙
k
=
A− δ − ρ
σ
(1.54)
The result is obtained by replacing expressions (1.46) and (1.47) in equation (1.53).
˙f(k)
f(k)
=
A+Bαkα−1
A+Bkα−1
k˙
k
(1.55)
lim
k→∞
˙f(k)
f(k)
= lim
k→∞
k˙
k
=
A− δ − ρ
σ
(1.56)
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The gross saving rate is also constant along the ABGP:
s = 1− c
y
= 1− x
z
(1.57)
lim
k→∞
s =
A− ρ− (1− σ)δ
σA
(1.58)
It is important to note that the conditions for the existence of an ABGP imply
an upper bound on the growth and saving rates preventing explosive or unstable
behavior.
We now proceed with some comparative statics on the constant variables x and s
(we exclude z since it is equal to A). The saving rate is increasing in A while the
converse is true for the consumption to capital ratio:
∂
∂A
lim
k→∞
s =
ρ+ (1− σ)δ
σA2
> 0 (1.59)
∂
∂A
lim
k→∞
x =
σ − 1
σ
< 0 (1.60)
The positive effect on the saving rate comes from the fact that after an increase
in the productivity parameter, a share of this increase is devoted to savings. The
decrease in the consumption to capital ratio is due to our assumption on positive
utility (σ < 1). This reflects the opposite effects in case of positive and negative
utility. In the latter case, the introduction of a discount rate decreasing in capital
would create an incentive towards consumption over capital accumulation.
Concerning the minimal discount rate and the elasticity of marginal utility, they
both increase the consumption to capital ratio and decrease the saving rate.
∂
∂σ
lim
k→∞
x =
1
σ
A− δ − ρ
σ
> 0 (1.61)
∂
∂ρ
lim
k→∞
x =
1
σ
> 0 (1.62)
∂
∂σ
lim
k→∞
s = −A− ρ− (1− σ)δ
Aσ2
< 0 (1.63)
∂
∂ρ
lim
k→∞
s = − 1
σA
< 0 (1.64)
A higher minimal discount rate implies a higher discount factor at each point in time
thus reducing the incentives for accumulation. The decrease in the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution works in a similar way. These two effects tend to dete-
riorate the saving rate and thus increase consumption as a share of capital. This
concludes the study of the ABGP. We can now focus on the possible existence of
steady-states equilibria.
Definition 2:
A steady-state equilibrium of this economy is a solution (ct, kt) to equations (1.30)
and (1.31) given k(0), such that gc = gk = gy = 0.
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Setting c˙ = k˙ = 0 in equations (1.30) and (1.31) we obtain:
c =
(A+Bαkα−1 − δ − ρ− ρ0e−βkγ )(σ − 1)(ρ+ ρ0e−βkγ )
γβkγ−1ρ0e−βk
γ (1.65)
c = Ak +Bkα − δk (1.66)
This system of equations is particularly difficult to solve due to expression (1.65)
such that we will rely on a phase diagram analysis.
Proposition 2:
In this economy, either there is no steady-state equilibrium either there are two of
them (k1 and k2 with k1 < k2). In the latter case, the first one (k1) characterized
by a lower capital stock is saddle-path stable while the second one (k2) is unstable.
The first steady-state can thus be seen as a poverty trap. Moreover, if γ > α, k1 > 0
while if γ < α, k1 = 0.
Proof. We first plug equation (1.66) into (1.65) in order to obtain the following
polynomial of order two in the variable ρ(k) = ρ+ ρ0e
−βkγ .
P(k) = −(1− σ)ρ(k)2 − ργβkγ(A+Bkα−1 − δ) (1.67)
+[(A+Bkα−1 − δ)γβkγ + (1− σ)(A+Bαkα−1 − δ)]ρ(k)
= 0
The discriminant is the following:
∆(k) = [(A+Bkα−1 − δ)γβkγ + (1− σ)(A+Bαkα−1 − δ)]2
−4(1− σ)ργβkγ(A+Bkα−1 − δ) (1.68)
If the previous expression is negative, there are no positive real solutions for ρ(k)
implying that there is no steady-state in this case and the only equilibrium is the
ABGP equilibrium. Moreover, since the product and the sum of the roots are posi-
tive given that σ < 1, in the case of a positive discriminant, we are in the presence
of two positive real roots and thus two steady-state equilibria. We should proceed
with the analysis in this case.
The steady-state curves have the following shape. Equation (1.66) is standard in
endogenous growth models and goes from zero to infinity for both capital and con-
sumption. Equation (1.65) goes from (c, k) = (−∞, 0) if γ > α or (c, k) = (0, 0) if
γ < α to (c, k) = (−∞,+∞).
This can be observed by rewriting equation (1.65) as
c =
1
γβρ0
(A+Bαkα−1 − δ − ρ− ρ0e−βkγ )(σ − 1)(ρ0 + ρeβkγ )k1−γ (1.69)
and taking the limit when k → 0 and k →∞:
lim
k→0
=
Bα
γβρ0
lim
k→0
kα−γ (1.70)
lim
k→∞
= −∞ (1.71)
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As can be noticed, the limit as k → 0 depends on the sign of α − γ. In order to
compute the second limit we used the fact that σ < 1 and A− δ − ρ > 0.
We now take the derivative of equations (1.65) and (1.66) with respect to capital to
obtain:
∂c
∂k
=
(
σ − 1
γβρ0
)
{[Bα(α− 1)kα−1−γ + γβρ0e−βkγ ](ρ0 + ρeβkγ )
+ρeβk
γ
(A+Bαkα−1 − δ − ρ− ρ0e−βkγ )
(
σ − 1
ρ0
)
(1.72)
+
(
σ − 1
γβρ0
)
(1− γ)k−γ(A+Bαkα−1 − δ − ρ− ρ0e−βkγ )(ρ0 + ρeβkγ )
∂c
∂k
= A+Bαkα−1 − δ (1.73)
Equation (1.66) is increasing and concave with a constant slope equal to A − δ in
the limit as k goes to infinity. The result is not immediate for equation (1.65) so
that we compute the limits of this derivative.
lim
k→∞
∂c
∂k
=
(
σ − 1
γβρ0
)
(A− δ − ρ)ρ lim
k→∞
eβk
γ
(1.74)
+
(
σ − 1
γβρ0
)
(1− γ)(A− δ − ρ) lim
k→∞
eβk
γ
kγ
lim
k→∞
∂c
∂k
= −∞ (1.75)
To obtain the result we make use of l’Hospital’s rule and the fact that by assumption
σ < 1.
We now compute the derivative when k converges toward zero.
lim
k→0
∂c
∂k
= (σ − 1)(ρ+ ρ0) (1.76)
+
(
σ − 1
γρ0β
)
(A− δ − ρ− ρ0)[γβρ+ (1− γ)(ρ0 + ρ) lim
k→0
k−γ]
+
{
(σ − 1) limk→0 kα−1−γ
γρ0β
[ρβα lim
k→0
kγ +Bα(ρ0 + ρ)(α− γ)]
}
lim
k→0
∂c
∂k
= +∞ (1.77)
since σ < 1 and α < 1. Equation (1.65) is thus first increasing as k converges to
zero and decreasing when k tends toward infinity. Finally, in order to obtain the
arrows of motion we compute the following derivatives.
∂c˙
∂c
=
A+Bαkα−1 − δ − ρ− ρ0e−βkγ
σ
(1.78)
+
[(1− σ)(Ak +Bkα − δk) + σ2c]γβkγ−1ρ0e−βkγ
σ(1− σ)(ρ+ ρ0e−βkγ ) > 0
∂k˙
∂c
= −1 < 0 (1.79)
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Combining the different elements, we obtain the phase diagram represented in Figure
1 which delivers a first saddle-path stable steady-state of stagnation and a second
unstable one. It should be noticed that if γ < α, the poverty trap is characterized
by capital and consumption levels equal to zero.
Figure 1: Phase diagram
If there is no steady-state equilibrium, the economy will simply converge toward
the asymptotic balanced growth path. We should come back to this case when
we will study the transitional dynamics of the model. The previous proposition
shows that the poverty trap case can be characterized by positive or zero capital
and consumption levels depending on the sign of α− γ. In the following we should
assume that α < γ and focus on the case where capital and consumption take
positive values at the poverty trap equilibrium. As can be seen from Figure 1,
the first steady-state is saddle-path stable while the second could seem a strange
attractor given the arrows of motion that could imply the existence of a periodic
solution. However, this possibility can be ruled out by the use of the Bendixson’s
criterion. In the present case, the criterion states that if the sum
∂c˙
∂c
+
∂k˙
∂k
(1.80)
has the same sign (6= 0) almost everywhere in a simply connected region, then
the planar autonomous system consisting of equations (1.16) and (1.17) has no
periodic solutions. This is indeed the case since our model is developed over a
simply connected region and the sum of partial derivatives is always positive.
From the phase diagram, we can see that if the economy starts with a level of
capital lower than k2, it will necessarily converge toward k1 which is a steady-state
of stagnation that can be interpreted as a poverty trap. This equilibrium will be
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reached by positive or negative growth respectively if k < k1 and k1 < k < k2.
The existence of a poverty trap is directly related to a low initial capital stock
level and its influence on the discount rate. The latter being relatively high pushes
agents to consume in order to satisfy present needs. As a consequence, agents not
willing or being unable to save enough, the economy converges toward a steady-
state of stagnation. On the contrary, if the initial level of capital is higher than
k2, the economy will converge toward the ABGP. In this case, the discount rate is
sufficiently low to incentivize agents to increase savings ensuring positive growth in
the long run.
Figure 2: Effect of productivity shocks
There is however a possibility to escape this poverty trap. A positive shock (or a
series of positive shocks) on the productivity parameters of the production function
might lead to the disappearance of both the poverty trap and the unstable steady-
state by shifting upward the steady-state curve of capital and downward the one
of consumption. The following partial derivatives show the effect of an increase in
the productivity parameter A on the steady-state equations. The first concerns the
k˙ = 0 equation while the second concerns the c˙ = 0 one.
∂c
∂A
= k > 0 (1.81)
∂c
∂A
=
(σ − 1)(ρ+ ρ0e−βkγ )
γβkγ−1ρ0e−βk
γ < 0 (1.82)
Provided that the shock is sufficiently strong, the economy will converge toward the
ABGP. This situation is depicted in Figure 2 with the corresponding movements of
the steady-state curves.
Note that the result depends on the fact that σ < 1 which implies that the second
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partial derivative is negative. The mechanism behind this positive result is the
following: as A increase, capital becomes more productive thus creating an incentive
towards accumulation and decreasing the discount rate. This in turn reduce the
incentives for immediate consumption and engage the economy on the dynamics of
the ABGP equilibrium. The inverse phenomenon is however totally possible such
that a negative shock affecting the productivity parameters might take the economy
to the dynamic path of the poverty trap. In this simplified model, this is the only
way to escape from the poverty trap. However, in a more realistic framework, any
element affecting positively the productivity of the economy could play a similar
role. We can think about productive public spending, knowledge acquisition trough
international trade or policies related to education for example.
1.4 Transitional dynamics
This section focuses on the transitional dynamics of our model. Depending on the
value of the capital stock, the results will be different. We can distinguish three cases.
Proposition 3 (Part 1):
If k0 > k2 or if the only competitive equilibrium is the ABGP equilibrium:
1) gk > gy > gc > 0
2) the saving rate s increases along the transition
3) gk, gy and gc increase along the transition
Proof. Let’s start by showing that gk > gy. By computing gy, we obtain
gy =
(
A+Bαkα−1
A+Bkα−1
)
gk < gk (1.83)
since α < 1. We also know that for k > k2, gk > 0 since the economy converges
toward the ABGP. Since we reach the balanced growth path only asymptotically,
it is not possible to have gc > gy along the transition. By contradiction, we know
that gy > gc. This completes the first part of the proof. A direct implication is that
gz and gx are both negative such that the average product of capital as well as the
consumption to capital ratio decrease along the transition. Moreover we also can
conlude that gx < gz < 0
Concerning the second part of the proposition, the gross saving rate is given by
s = 1 − c
y
. From the first part of the proposition we know that gy > gc implying
that the saving rate increases along the transition.
For the third part, we take the derivative of the growth rate of capital and output
with respect to time obtaining:
dgk
dt
= z˙ − x˙ > 0 (1.84)
since z˙ x
z
> x˙ and x
z
< 1.
dgy
dt
=
ABkα−1[(α− 1)gk]2
(A+Bkα−1)2
+
(
A+Bαkα−1
A+Bkα−1
)
dgk
dt
> 0 (1.85)
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from equation (1.84).
Concerning the growth rate of consumption, the sign of dgc
dt
is ambiguous. However,
we know from the first part of the proposition that gk > gc. Given that gk increases
along the transition and limk→∞ gk = limk→∞ gc > 0, we can conclude that gc will
also increase along the transition toward the ABGP.
The acceleration of the growth rate of output results from two different effects.
The first one is the increase in the growth rate of capital while the second is the con-
vergence of the marginal product of capital with the average product of capital. In
the limit, both variables are equal to A. The increase in the growth rates of capital
and consumption is due to the continuous decrease in the discount rate which more
than compensate for the decrease in the marginal productivity of capital. Given
that the saving rate is also increasing since output grows faster than consumption
along the transition, we obtain the desired positive correlation between increasing
growth and saving rates for economies converging toward the ABGP. The increas-
ing patience of the representative agent is the key to understand the dynamics of
endogenous variables in the present framework.
Proposition 3 (Part 2):
If k0 < k1:
1) gk > gy > 0 and gc > gy
2) the saving rate s decreases
3) gk, gy and gc will decrease along the transition
Proof. Growth of capital is positive during the transition (gk > 0) but must come to
an end in order to reach the steady-state of stagnation k1. This implies that gc > gy
is a necessary condition for convergence. The fact that gk > gy comes again from
equation (1.83).
From the first part of the proposition we can directly conclude that the saving rate
decreases.
Since gk > 0 during the transition and limk→k1 gk = 0, we know that gk has to
decrease along the transition toward k1. Given that gk > gy, the same is true for gy.
Concerning the growth rate of consumption, we know that gc > 0 and limc→c1 gc = 0
such that gc must also decrease along the transition.
The economy faces two opposite effects with relatively high interest and discount
rates which respectively favor capital accumulation and immediate consumption. As
before, the discounting effect dominates such that despite the fact that accumulation
proceeds, the path is unsustainable in the long run since consumption grows faster
then output, thus driving the economy toward a steady-state of stagnation.
Proposition 3 (Part 3):
If k1 < k0 < k2:
1) gk < gy < 0 and gc < gy
2) the saving rate s increases
3) gk, gy and gc will increase along the transition
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Proof. This situation is the exact opposite of the previous one and the arguments
can be easily reverted. In this case, growth of capital is negative bust must reach
zero implying that gy > gc and again from equation (1.83) we know that gk < gy.
The saving rate is negative increases since gy > gc.
Since all growth rates are negative and must be equal to zero in the limit, we can
apply the same methodology as before and conclude that the growth rates of capital,
output and consumption will increase along the transition.
The interest rate and discount rate effects are still present. However, the second
is still dominant in this case and induce the representative agent to consume the
entire output and a share of the capital stock at each period of time, thus enhancing
negative savings and growth.
1.5 Confrontation to empirical evidence
This section shows that the characteristics of the present model are in accordance
with the empirical results found in the literature. These are decreasing and then
stabilizing interest and discount rates, increasing and then stabilizing growth and
saving rates as well as the tendency toward a twin peak distribution of the world
income with growth miracles and disasters.
• Clark (2007) shows that the interest rate has been falling if we focus on a
sufficiently large period starting in the thirteen century with interest rates
close to 11 percent in Europe while they had fallen to a 5 percent average
for the last century (in fact interest rates stayed roughly constants until the
seventeen century). In the long run however, we observe a roughly constant
interest rate as documented by Kaldor (1957).
• The tendency for the discount rate to decrease is empirically studied in Lawrence
(1991) who argues that the discount rate of poor households is 5 percent higher
than for rich households or in Samwick (1998) which observes that the discount
rate decreases with the income level. Clark (2007) also argues that the ob-
served decrease in the real interest rate can only be due to a similar decrease in
the discount rate. In our model, this is made possible trough the accumulation
of capital.
• Concerning the increasing growth rate of endogenous variables, Galor (2005)
documented an increasing growth rate of income per capita in Europe from
0,15 percent per year before 1820 to 0,95 percent between 1820 and 1870,
finally reaching 2 percent during the last century. On average, this growth
rate has been stable from then on.
• The saving rate has been increasing from 11,7 percent in 1831 (Galor 2005) to
around 23 percent in the seventies for developed countries. A share that has
then stabilized.
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• Jones (1997) finds that the world distribution is changing from a somewhat
normal distribution with thick tails toward a bimodal distribution (usually de-
nominated twin peaks in the literature). Moreover Azariadis and Stachurski
(2005) documented that poor countries tend to stagnate while rich countries
tend to become richer. This feature is captured in our model by the exis-
tence of both a low income saddle-path stable steady-state and an ABGP.
The unstable steady-state might be interpreted as the unstable attractor of
the normal distribution.
• Jones (1997) also identifies a series of growth miracles such as some well known
east-Asian countries but also Botswana and Romania and growth disasters as
in several sub-Saharan African countries and Vene-
zuela to cite a few examples. These reversal of fortune are explained in our
model by the effect of changes in the productivity parameters on the existence
of steady-state equilibria. We don’t want to make the claim that growth
miracles and disasters can be explained only by productivity shocks but rather
that public policies affecting the productivity of the economy might explain
the movements that we observe within the world distribution of income.
1.6 Conclusion
The present paper had two main ojectives: the first one was to argue that a model
where the discount rate is decreasing in capital accumulation should impose a utility
function that takes only positive values following the argumentation of Schumacher
(2011). The second was to show that in this case a model respecting appropriate
second-order sufficiency conditions can still shed light on some key stylized facts
concerning the growth process.
In order to do so, we derived necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of an ABGP equilibrium which impose a lower bound on the elasticity of marginal
utility. We also showed that this economy may or not exhibit multiple equilibria.
In the latter case, we proved the existence of a saddle-path stable steady-state
which can be interpreted as a poverty trap. The combination of these different
elements allows the model to generate a positive correlation between increasing
saving and growth rates as well as a bimodal distribution of income around the
ABGP equilibrium and the poverty trap. The possibility of escaping the poverty
trap has been explored trough exogenous shocks on the productivity parameters.
However, further research should focus on the cost of implementing public policies
which actually increase those productivity parameters allowing to escape the poverty
trap.
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Chapter 2
Habits in consumption,
environmental quality and
intergenerational inequalities
2.1 Introduction
The present paper focuses on the role of habits in consumption concerning environ-
mental degradation and intergenerational inequalities in an overlapping generation
setup. It has recently become common in economics to define sustainable develop-
ment as growth paths ensuring non-decreasing utility levels or at least utility levels
above a certain reference point (Stavins, Wagner and Wagner 2003, Pezzey 2004).
The choice of these criteria can potentially rule out any growth path characterized
by fluctuations of endogenous variables. Related to this issue is the observation
that economist have started to devote attention to the intergenerational aspects
of environmental degradation (see for example Howarth 1997, Pezzey and Toman
2002, John and Pecchenino 1994, Seegmuller and Verchere 2004, Cao, Wang and
Wang 2011). Most of the current models devoted to sustainability problems in fact
take into account environmental quality as an important element of the analysis.
These models without habits and augmented with an environmental constraint are
however mostly characterized by monotonic dynamics except the works of Seeg-
muller and Verchere (2004) and Cao, Wang and Wang (2011). In the first case, the
authors prove the existence of a Flip bifurcation using a utility function linear in
consumption. In the second, by using a nonlinear pollution accumulation equation,
the authors also prove the existence of a Flip bifurcation and the breakdown of sev-
eral sustainability criteria.
Our particular interest on habits derives from the fact that as shown by de la Croix
and Michel (1999) or Artige, Camacho and de la Croix (2004), habits can have se-
vere effects on transitional dynamics such as local oscillations or limit cycles. For
a long time, these kind of ”extended preferences”, following Becker’s (1997) termi-
nology, have been disconnected from environmental concerns. However recently, a
certain number of authors have introduced habits in pollution or in environmental
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quality in otherwise standard overlapping generation frameworks. Schumacher and
Zou (2008) study habits in pollution and identify a large set of possible behaviors
for their dynamical system including local oscillations and bifurcations giving rise to
intergenerational inequalities during the transition and in the long run. Chen and Li
(2011) analyze habits in environmental quality and derive results concerning possible
chaotic behavior for their one dimensional system. These models however only focus
on the competitive equilibrium and do not try to design an adequate optimal policy.
Our objective is to study an overlapping generations framework along the lines of
John and Pecchenino (1994) and Seegmuller and Verchere (2004) where agents pos-
sess habits in consumption and are subject to an environmental constraint in which
consumption from both young and old generations exerts a negative impact on en-
vironmental quality which can be at least partially compensated by maintenance
investment. We wish to focus on both the competitive and the optimal outcome in
order to be able to address policy issues. Habits in consumption have up to now
been modelled in different ways in the overlapping generation litterature. While
de la Croix (1996) and de la Croix and Michel (1999) study a framework where
children inherit the consumption habits of their parents reflecting the idea of family
capital, Wendner (2002) proposes a framework where higher adult’s consumption
has a negative impact on old age utility for a given level of consumption when old
reflecting the idea of personal capital. Given our particular interest concerning in-
tergenerational inequalities, we choose to focus on the first approach where habits
transmission can act as an important intergenerational externality. One implication
of this formulation is that reported satisfaction levels do not necessarily rise with
economic development which is in accordance with empirical evidence provided by
Easterlin (1995). As expressed by Lucas (1988), if a generation of individuals is
twice as rich as a previous one, this does not imply that they will be twice as sat-
isfied. The model thus exhibits two kind of intergenerational inequalities related
respectively to habits and pollution accumulation.
An account of the results is as follows. In the present case, the competitive steady-
state capital stock level can be higher or lower than in the standard Diamond
economy. The combination of habits in consumption and potential environmental
degradation generates non-monotonic dynamic behavior such as local oscillations
and limit-cycles. The consequence being that some important sustainability criteria
such as non-decreasing utility levels can be violated. We also study the optimal
economy by solving the social planner’s problem and derive conclusions concerning
its decentralization. In order to reach the optimal outcome, investment should be
taxed or subsidized depending on the parameters of interest and maintenance in-
vestment should always be subsidized. If capital needs to be taxed, the optimal tax
policy goes against the one applied in the case without environmental quality stud-
ied by de la Croix and Michel (1999) where subsidies to capital accumulation are
always needed. The optimal solution can however still be subject to local oscillations
even in the no discounting case implying that if a standard social welfare function
is used without an appropriate sustainability constraint, we are able to solve for the
environmental externalities but not for the sustainability issue.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
derives the first order conditions and argues that these are also sufficient to ensure
the existence of a maximum. The intertemporal equilibrium is studied in section 3.
Section 4 focuses on the local dynamics of our model and contains some core results
of the paper. The optimal solution is presented in section 5 while the decentraliza-
tion of the first best solution is addressed in section 6. The last section is devoted
to the conclusion.
2.2 The model
We consider a competitive overlapping generations model where agents live for three
periods and have perfect foresight. Population is constant and normalized to one.
The young generation does not take any decision and inherits consumption habits
from their parents, ht. In adulthood, the representative agent supplies inelastically
one unit of labor and earns in exchange the real wage wt. This wage is split between
present consumption ct, savings st and maintenance investment mt.
wt = ct + st +mt (2.1)
In old age, the agent retires and earns the gross return Rt+1 on his savings from
which he consumes dt+1.
dt+1 = Rt+1st (2.2)
Environmental quality is a public good that evolves according to:
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − χ(ct + dt) + ξmt (2.3)
where b ∈ [0, 1] measures the speed at which environmental quality returns to its
natural level which in this case is zero, χ > 0 measures the impact of total consump-
tion on environmental quality and ξ > 0 the effectiveness of maintenance investment.
The fact that present decisions only affect future levels of environmental quality cre-
ates an intergenerational externality, which is justified by the fact that the evolution
of environmental quality is a long term process. The possible negative externalities
due to consumption can in general arise several years after their creation.
The life-cycle utility function of the representative agent is defined over present and
future consumption, the future environmental quality level, habits in consumption
and takes the following form:
U(ct, ht, dt+1, Pt+1) = θ ln(ct − γht) + δ ln(dt+1) + η ln(Et+1) (2.4)
Habits can be seen as a frame of reference against which present consumption is
evaluated and γ represents the intensity of the habit effect. The reason for not
including present environmental quality in adulthood utility is that agents are un-
able to influence present quality when making their decisions about consumption
and maintenance investment. We thus assume that present quality has no effect on
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adulthood utility. The parameters θ, δ and η are the weights associated respectively
to present consumption, future consumption and environmental quality. Further-
more, for technical reasons we should assume that δ + θ + η = 1.
We will also consider that habits are equivalent to the consumption of the previous
adult generation such that children get used to particular consumption standards
when living with their parents.
ht = ct−1 (2.5)
Concerning preferences, we assume that the depreciation rate of habits is particu-
larly high since the old generation is not affected by them. This assumption can be
justified by empirical evidence showing that aspirations are less important for older
persons. Clark and al. (1996) show for example that reported satisfaction levels
increase with age. Older persons putting less weight on comparisons in their welfare
evaluation.
In the present framework, the economy faces two kind of intergenerational exter-
nalities. The first one is due to habits as a frame of reference originating in the
consumption of the previous young generation. The second is due to old age con-
sumption, which will affect the level of environmental quality faced by the following
generations.
Concerning production, there is a representative firm which produces an homoge-
neous good with a Cobb-Douglas production function, yt = Ak
α
t where α is the share
of capital in the production process and we assume complete depreciation after one
period. The firm then maximizes profits in a competitive market that clears:
Rt = αAk
α−1
t (2.6)
wt = (1− α)Akαt (2.7)
st = kt+1 (2.8)
A representative adult faces the following problem:
max
ct,dt+1,st,mt
θ ln(ct − γht) + δ ln(dt+1) + η ln(Et+1) (2.9)
subject to 
wt = ct + st +mt
dt+1 = Rt+1st
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − χ(ct + dt) + ξmt
ct, dt+1, st,mt ≥ 0
given wt, Rt+1, Et and dt.
Substituting for ct, dt+1 and Et+1 in expression (2.9) and taking the derivative with
respect to st and mt we obtain the following first order conditions:
∂U
∂st
=
−θ
ct − γht +
δRt+1
dt+1
+
ηχ
Et+1
= 0 (2.10)
∂U
∂mt
=
−θ
ct − γht +
η(χ+ ξ)
Et+1
= 0 (2.11)
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Concerning second order conditions, we can see that our constraints are linear. We
thus only need to prove that our utility function is concave. The computation of
the Hessian matrix concerning the utility function gives:
H =

− θ
(ct−γht)2 0 0
0 − δ
(dt+1)2
0
0 0 − η
(Et+1)2
 (2.12)
As can be seen immediately, the leading principal minors alternate in sign such that
the Hessian matrix is negative definite and our objective function is indeed concave.
We can proceed with the first order conditions.
δRt+1
dt+1
=
ηξ
Et+1
(2.13)
θ
ct − γht =
η(χ+ ξ)
Et+1
(2.14)
Equation (2.13) represents the equalization between the marginal benefit of increas-
ing savings and the marginal cost of reducing present consumption. In order to
identify the effect of the different parameters, we use the implicit function theorem
and obtain
sδ =
s
δ
> 0, sη = − ξs
2
δEt+1
< 0, sξ = − ηs
2
δEt+1
< 0
From these results, we can see that a higher relative preference for future consump-
tion, δ, will imply higher savings. A higher relative preference towards environ-
mental quality, η, will push the representative agent to save less and invest more
in maintenance investment in order to increase future environmental quality. Fi-
nally, if agents consider that maintenance effectiveness, ξ, is quite low, they will
prefer to save more in order to consume more in the future and to avoid environ-
mental degradation through immediate consumption. Equation (2.14) represents
the equalization between the marginal benefit of increasing future environmental
quality trough maintenance investment and the marginal cost of decreasing actual
consumption. As before, we use the implicit function theorem and obtain
cθ =
(ct − γht)
θ
> 0, cγ = ht > 0, cη = −(χ+ ξ)(ct − γht)
2
θEt+1
< 0
cχ = −η(ct − γht)
2
θEt+1
< 0, cξ = −η(ct − γht)
2
θEt+1
< 0
A higher relative preference for present consumption, θ, as well as a higher effect
of habits, γ, imply higher present consumption and thus a decrease in future envi-
ronmental quality. A higher relative preference towards environmental quality, η,
will imply lower present consumption in order to avoid an important environmen-
tal degradation. Similarly, a higher impact of total consumption on environmental
quality, χ, and of maintenance effectiveness, ξ, will imply a substitution towards
savings or maintenance investment.
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2.3 Intertemporal equilibrium
By using the first order conditions, the market clearing condition for capital, the
feasibility constraint and the fact that Et+1 =
ξη
δ
kt+1 at equilibrium, we are able to
define the intertemporal equilibrium of this economy.
Definition 1:
An intertemporal equilibrium of this economy is a sequence {kt, ht}∞0 with initial
conditions {k0, h0} that satisfies the following difference equations:
kt+1 = η(1− b)kt + δ
ξ
[ξ − (χ+ ξ)α]Akαt −
δ
ξ
(χ+ ξ)γht (2.15)
ht+1 =
θξη(1− b)
δ(χ+ ξ)
kt +
θ[ξ − (χ+ ξ)α]
(χ+ ξ)
Akαt + (1− θ)γht (2.16)
By setting kt+1 = kt = k and ht+1 = ht = h = c, we derive the steady-states of this
economy. There exist two steady-states, the first one is trivial with {k, c} = (0, 0).
The other steady-state is given by
k =
{
Aδ[ξ − (χ+ ξ)α](1− γ)
ξ(1− γ)[1− η(1− b)] + θξγ
} 1
1−α
(2.17)
c =
θξ
δ(χ+ ξ)(1− γ)k (2.18)
The condition for the existence of a positive steady-state is that the numerator
and the denominator of equation (2.17) have the same sign. The denominator is
always positive given our assumption concerning the parameters of the model. The
numerator is also positive only if the following condition is met:
χ
ξ
<
1− α
α
(2.19)
This allows for the possibility that it takes less effort to pollute than to clean up but
that this difference cannot be too large and is bounded above by an ratio involving
the elasticity of capital in the production function. Moreover, if this condition is
met, output has a positive impact on capital growth as can be seen from equation
(2.15).
We can now study the influence of the parameters of interest on the steady-state
values. We should focus on parameters which are not present in the standard Dia-
mond framework. In order to do so, we take the derivative of equations (2.17) with
respect to γ, ξ, χ, η and b.
∂k
∂γ
= − Aθδ[ξ − (χ+ ξ)α]
ξ2(1− α){(1− γ)[1− η(1− b)] + θγ}2k
α
< 0 (2.20)
The negative impact of γ on the steady-state capital stock can be explained by the
deterring effect that habits play on savings and thus on capital accumulation.
∂k
∂ξ
=
{(1− γ)[1− η(1− b)] + θγ}Aδ(1− γ)χα
ξ2(1− α){(1− γ)[1− η(1− b)] + θγ}2 k
α
> 0 (2.21)
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In this case, the impact is positive since a high maintenance effectiveness allows the
representative agent to devote more ressources to savings.
∂k
∂χ
= − Aδα(1− γ)
(1− α)ξ{(1− γ)[1− η(1− b)] + θγ}k
α
< 0 (2.22)
Intuitively, a large impact of consumption on environmental quality pushes the
agents to invest in environmental maintenance at the expenses of the capital stock.
∂k
∂η
=
Aδξ(1− b)[ξ − (χ+ ξ)α](1− γ)2
(1− α){ξ(1− γ)[1− η(1− b)] + θξγ}2k
α
> 0 (2.23)
A larger relative preference for future environmental quality induces agents to save
more in order to avoid environmental degradation through immediate consumption.
∂k
∂b
= − Aδξη[ξ − (χ+ ξ)α](1− γ)
2
(1− α){ξ(1− γ)[1− η(1− b)] + θξγ}2k
α
< 0 (2.24)
Finally, a larger speed of recovery of the environment has a negative impact on the
steady-state capital stock since agents can devote resources to present consumption
without large consequences on environmental quality thus depressing savings.
The opposite effects that we have identified imply that the steady-state capital stock
might be lower or higher than in the standard Diamond model. We can now proceed
with the dynamics of the model in the following section.
2.4 The dynamics
We now compute the Jacobian matrix around the non-trivial steady-state (k, c):
J =
 η(1−b)(1−α)(1−γ)+α[1−γ(1−θ)]1−γ − δ(χ+ξ)γξ
θξ
δ(χ+ξ)
{
η(1−b)(1−α)(1−γ)+α[1−γ(1−θ)]
1−γ
}
(1− θ)γ
 (2.25)
The characteristic function P (λ) is given by:
P (λ) = λ2 − Tr(J)λ+Det(J)
where
Det(J) =
η(1− b)(1− α)(1− γ) + α[1− γ(1− θ)]
1− γ (2.26)
Tr(J) = Det(J) + (1− θ)γ (2.27)
It is usefull to notice that given our assumption on parameters, both the determi-
nant and the trace can only take positive values. The following proposition assesses
the possible dynamic behavior of our planar system.
Proposition 1:
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Consider an interior competitive equilibria:
(i) The fixed point (k(γ), h(γ)) is hyperbolic if γ 6= γˆ where:
γˆ =
1− η(1− b)(1− α)− α
1− η(1− b)(1− α)− α(1− θ) (2.28)
(ii) If the combination of parameters is such that Tr(J)2−4Det(J) < 0, it is possible
that the orbit around the fixed point (k(γ), h(γ)) is oscillatory on an interval γ1 <
γ < γ2. Moreover, for this complex eigenvalues case, the fixed point is asymptotically
stable if γ < γˆ and unstable otherwise.
(iii) In the case of real eigenvalues, that is when Tr(J)2 − 4Det(J) > 0, the fixed
point is asymptotically stable if γ < γˆ and unstable otherwise.
(iiii) Neimark-Sacker bifurcation: Let (kˆ, hˆ) be the fixed point associated to γ = γˆ.
There is a neighborhood U of γˆ for which there is, either for γ < γˆ or for γ > γˆ, a
closed invariant curve Γ which encircles (kˆ, hˆ).
Proof. In planar maps, non-hyperbolicity may only arise if there is an eigenvalue
equal to 1, if there is an eigenvalue equal to -1, or if the two eigenvalues are complex
conjugates with modulus 1.
In the present case, we can see that the first condition is equivalent to γ = 1/(1− θ)
since Tr(J) = Det(J) + (1− θ)γ. This case can be excluded given our assumptions
on the parameters.
The second condition is equivalent to 1 + Tr(J) + Det(J) = 0 which can also be
excluded given that Tr(J) > 0 and Det(J) > 0.
The third condition is equivalent to Det(J) = 1 and Tr(J) ∈ [−2, 2]. Notice first
that since Tr(J) = Det(J)+(1−θ)γ, the restriction on the determinant immediately
implies that the necessary restriction on the trace is met. We can then obtain the
corresponding value for our habit parameter:
γˆ =
1− η(1− b)(1− α)− α
1− η(1− b)(1− α)− α(1− θ) (2.29)
This concludes the first part of the proof.
Concerning the second part of the proposition, by computing the condition for com-
plex eigenvalues, we obtain the following cubic function:
P(γ) = 2(1− θ)[η(1− b)(1− α) + (1− θ)α]γ3
+{η(1− b)(1− α)[η(1− b)(1− α) + 2(1− θ)α− 4(1− θ)]}γ2
+(1− θ)α[(1− θ)α− 2(2− θ)]γ2 + 2(1− θ)α(1− α)γ
+2η(1− b)(1− α)[η(1− b)(1− α)− (2− θ)α + 1− θ]γ
+η(1− b)(1− α)[η(1− b)(1− α) + 2α] + α2
< 0 (2.30)
Given that the polynomial is of order three and involves an important number of
parameters in the coefficients, we choose to not compute the roots but to check
if it is possible to obtain an interval on which the orbit around the fixed point is
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oscillatory. In order to do so, we rely on Descartes’ rule of sign and check the
sign of the different elements of the polynomial. Assuming first that γ > 0, it
can be proved that the signs alternate in the following way starting from the cubic
coefficient: > 0, < 0, > 0, > 0. There are thus two changes of sign implying that the
number of positive real roots is equal to two or zero. Assuming now that γ < 0,
we can determine the number of negative real roots. In this case, there is only one
change of sign implying that we have a unique negative real root. If the two positive
roots are not complex conjugates, they constitute an interval γ1 < γ < γ2 on which
the orbits around the fixed point are oscillatory. Moreover, we know that in the case
of complex eigenvalues, the condition for asymptotic stability is that Det(J) < 1
which is equivalent to γ < γˆ.
In the case of real eigenvalues, that is γ /∈ [γ1; γ2], the fixed point is asymptotically
stable if Det(J) < 1 and 1−Tr(J) +Det(J) > 0. These conditions are respectively
equivalent to γ < γˆ and γ < 1/(1− θ). The second condition being always satisfied
given our assumptions on the parameters, we are left with the first one.
Concerning the last part of the proposition, it can be checked that when γ = γˆ,
the two eigenvalues are complex conjugates, they cross the unit circle at non-zero
speed when γ changes around γˆ and none of them may be of the first four roots of
unity. The fulfillment of these conditions implies the existence of a Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation.
As can be seen from the first proposition, the critical values of γ only depend
on a limited number of parameters such as the share of capital in the production
function α, the relative preference for present consumption θ and environmental
quality δ and the natural regeneration rate b. The productivity parameter A, the
maintenance effectiveness χ and the pollution impact of total consumption ξ have
no influence on hyperbolicity, stability or on convergence (monotonic or oscillatory).
The interactions between the four parameters (α, θ, η, b) are thus the key elements
explaining the dynamic behavior of our dynamical system.
The appearance of a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation ensures the existence of a limit-
cycle (the invariant curve Γ) implying constant fluctuations of endogenous variables
around the steady-state. It is important to explain the mechanism by which cycli-
cal behavior can appear in the present model. At the intertemporal equilibrium,
savings finance the capital stock that is used to produce and to pay the wages of
young workers. This process exhibits decreasing returns given our assumption on
the production function. On the other hand, habits create an incentive for increasing
present consumption which in turn decreases environmental quality. At some point,
this negative effect on environmental quality generates an incentive for maintenance
investment. The combination of habits in consumption and maintenance investment
has a depressing effect on savings inducing a recession. As a consequence, the capital
stock decreases followed by consumption. Maintenance investment and the decrease
in consumption having a positive effect on environmental quality. Once the decrease
is sufficiently strong, a rise in savings occurs together with the start of an expansion
period. This process can converge or not to the steady-state with the possibility of
everlasting fluctuations.
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The relatively simple expression for γˆ allows us to identify the role that the different
parameters can play in the appearance of a limit-cycle. We can see that ∂γˆ/∂θ < 0,
∂γˆ/∂η < 0 and ∂γˆ/∂b > 0. A higher θ pushes present consumption upward such
that a lower level of the habit parameter is needed in order to obtain cyclical be-
havior. Similarly, a higher η pushes maintenance investment upwards and acts in a
similar way by depressing savings such that a lower level of the habit parameter is
compatible with the existence of a limit-cycle. On the contrary, a higher b implies
that environmental quality converges faster to its natural level such that mainte-
nance investment might be less needed and a larger habit parameter is required for
a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation to appear.
Given the possibility of different kind of endogenous fluctuations in the present
model, successive generations might not enjoy the same level of capital, consump-
tion and environmental quality in the short as well as in the long run. It is thus
important to rewrite utility as a function of our state variables in order to assess
the behavior of welfare. This is the objective of the next proposition.
Proposition 2:
The equilibrium level of utility of the representative generation can be expressed as
a function of the equilibrium future capital stock. In particular, utility is always
pro-cyclical.
Proof. The utility of a particular generation is U(.) = θ ln(ct − γht) + δ ln(dt+1) +
η ln(Et+1). By using the FOC, the constraints dt+1 = Rt+1st and st = kt+1, we
obtain U(.) = θ ln( θξkt+1
δ(χ+ξ)
) + δ ln(Aαkαt+1) + η ln(
ηξkt+1
δ
). Taking the derivative with
respect to kt+1:
∂U(.)
∂kt+1
=
θ
kt+1
+
δα
kt+1
+
η
kt+1
> 0 (2.31)
Welfare follows the motion of capital and this result combined with endogenous
fluctuations imply that generations born at different periods of time might suffer
from welfare inequalities. The existing literature on sustainable development iden-
tifies intergenerational inequalities as one of the factors giving rise to what can be
considered as unsustainable development paths. It has become common in economic
theory to define sustainable development as the necessity to ensure non-decreasing
utility for future generations or a least to ensure that utility will not decrease un-
der a given utility level (Stavins, Wagner and Wagner 2003, Pezzey 2004). In the
present case, both criteria might not be respected since fluctuating welfare in the
short and the long run is a possible outcome of the model. Our next goal is to study
the optimal allocation of this economy.
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2.5 Optimal solution
In this section, we consider the case of a central planner who chooses the allocation
of resources in order to maximize the discounted welfare of current and future gen-
erations. Contrary to the representative agent in the competitive equilibrium case,
the planner takes into account the effect of habits on present consumption and the
effect of old age consumption on environmental quality. The social discount factor
is given by β and the planner solves the following problem:
max
{ct,dt+1,mt,ht+1,kt+1,Et+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt[θ ln(ct − γht) + δ ln(dt+1) + η ln(Et+1)] (2.32)
subject to: 
Akαt = ct + dt + kt+1 +mt
ht = ct−1
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − χ(ct + dt) + ξmt
given initial conditions {k0, E0, h0}.
The Lagrangian function is the following:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt[θ ln(ct − γht) + δ ln(dt+1) + η ln(Et+1)] (2.33)
+
∞∑
t=0
βtλt(Ak
α
t − ct − dt −mt − kt+1)
+
∞∑
t=0
βtµt(Et+1 − (1− b)Et + χ(ct + dt)− ξmt)
+
∞∑
t=0
βtνt(ht − ct−1)
The first order conditions of the maximization problem are
∂L
∂ct
=
βtθ
ct − γht − β
tλt + β
tµtχ− βt+1νt+1 = 0 (2.34)
∂L
∂dt+1
=
βtδ
dt+1
− βt+1λt+1 + βt+1µt+1χ = 0 (2.35)
∂L
∂mt
= −βtλt − βtµtξ = 0 (2.36)
∂L
∂kt+1
= −βtλt + βt+1λt+1Aαkα−1t+1 = 0 (2.37)
∂L
∂ht+1
= − β
t+1θγ
ct+1 − γct + β
t+1νt+1 = 0 (2.38)
∂L
∂Et+1
=
βtη
Et+1
+ βtµt − βt+1µt+1(1− b) = 0 (2.39)
lim
t→∞ β
tλtkt = 0 (2.40)
lim
t→∞ β
tµtPt = 0 (2.41)
lim
t→∞ β
tνtht = 0 (2.42)
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As before, given that our objective function is concave and our constraints are
concave or linear, we know that the first order conditions are also sufficient for
optimality and we obtain:
δ
βdt
=
θ
ct − γht −
βγθ
ct+1 − γct (2.43)
dt+1 = βdtAαk
α−1
t+1 (2.44)
η(χ+ ξ)
Et+1
=
δ
βdt
− δ(1− b)
dt+1
(2.45)
Equation (2.43) describes the allocation of consumption between generations alive
at the same time. The marginal utility of consumption is corrected to internalize the
effect of habits and is equalized to the marginal utility of consumption of the old.
Equation (2.44) is standard and describes the intertemporal allocation of consump-
tion. Finally, equation (2.45) describes the allocation between consumption and
maintenance at a point in time. The marginal benefit of maintenance investment is
equalized to the marginal utility of consumption corrected for the effect of habits as
well as for the effect of old-age consumption on environmental quality.
Definition 2:
An intertemporal optimal allocation of this economy is a sequence
{ct, dt,mt, kt, ht, Et}∞0 with initial conditions {k0, h0, E0} that satisfies the following
difference equations:
ct+1 =
β2θγ(ct − γht)dt
βθdt − δ(ct − γht) + γct (2.46)
dt+1 =
β2δ(1− b)dtEt+1
δEt+1 − ηβ(χ+ ξ)dt (2.47)
dt+1 = βdtAαk
α−1
t+1 (2.48)
kt+1 = Ak
α
t − ct − dt −mt (2.49)
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − χ(ct + dt) + ξmt (2.50)
ht+1 = ct (2.51)
The steady-state of this optimal allocation is given by
k∗ = (Aαβ)
1
1−α (2.52)
d∗ =
(
1− αβ
αβ
)
k∗ × (2.53)
ξδ(1− γ)[1− β(1− b)]
(χ+ ξ){[1− β(1− b)][θβ(1− βγ) + δ(1− γ)] + βbη(1− γ)}
c∗ =
θβ(1− βγ)
δ(1− γ) d
∗ (2.54)
E∗ =
ηβ(χ+ ξ)
δ[1− β(1− b)]d
∗ (2.55)
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m∗ =
(
1− αβ
αβ
)
k∗ − θβ(1− βγ) + δ(1− γ)
δ(1− γ) d (2.56)
where starred variables denote the optimal outcome. Equation (2.52) is the modified
golden rule such that the optimal steady-state capital stock level is the same as in
the standard overlapping generation model. The allocation of consumption between
young and old and the level of environmental quality at the steady-state are however
strongly influenced by the main parameters of the model. It can be seen that the
steady-state capital stock level is not necessarly higher in the optimal case. This
can be translated as a condition on the social discount factor. In fact, k∗ > k if and
only if:
β >
δ[ξ − (χ+ ξ)α](1− γ)
ξ(1− γ)[1− η(1− b)] + θξγ (2.57)
If the previous condition is not fulfilled, it would be necessary to tax capital contrary
to the case without pollution studied by de la Croix and Michel (1999) where invest-
ment always needs to be subsidied. This is due to the fact that in the competitive
case, agents have an incentive to increase savings in order to avoid a relatively low
environmental quality when old. However, by not taking into account the external-
ity that old-age consumption exerts on environmental quality, agents might push
the steady-state capital stock level away from the modified golden rule.
It is also interesting to compare this solution with the no discounting case equivalent
to β = 1. In this case, the steady-state optimal solution does not depend on the
habit parameter γ as can be seen from the following expressions:
k∗ = (Aα)
1
1−α (2.58)
d∗ =
ξδ(1− α)
α(χ+ ξ)
k∗ (2.59)
c∗ =
ξθ(1− α)
α(χ+ ξ)
k∗ (2.60)
E∗ =
ξη(1− α)
αb
k∗ (2.61)
m∗ =
(
1− α
α
) [
1− ξ(1− η)
χ+ ξ
]
k∗ (2.62)
This result implies that if generations are treated equally by the planner, habits will
have no influence on the steady-state allocation of consumption between young and
old generations and on the environmental quality level. The steady-state capital
stock being equal to the golden rule. In this case, the elimination of the discount
factor compensates for the distortions generated by habits such as the overconsump-
tion of the young as well as environmental degradation. This is however only true
for the steady-state case and not for the transitional dynamics as can be seen from
the first order conditions (2.43), (2.44) and (2.45).
An important question related to the previous result is how could our optimal so-
lution converge to this outcome which partly eliminates the distorsions linked to
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habits. This is not possible if we don’t modify our objective function given that the
latter would not be bounded anymore and convergence could not be guaranteed. A
potential solution has been suggested by Ramsey (1928) and extended by Michel
(1990) more recently. The idea is to fix the rate of time preference at a rate equal
to the growth rate of population. In this case, the planner does not discount future
utilities and treat all generations equally. In the present case, with no population
growth, the rate of time preference should be equal to zero. Michel (1990) shows
that a formulation allowing to obtain this result corresponds to the original Ramsey
problem. In the present case, we obtain the following welfare function:
∞∑
t=0
[θ ln(ct − γht) + δ ln(dt+1) + η ln(Et+1)− Uˆ ] (2.63)
where Uˆ is the maximal utility achievable by a generation and is defined by:
Uˆ = maxU(c, d, E) (2.64)
subject to
Akα = c+ d+m+ k (2.65)
Eb = ξm− χ(c+ d) (2.66)
h = c (2.67)
We should then replace our discounted welfare function by the objective function
(2.63) which allows to obtain the solution where β = 1.
Turning now to the dynamics of the optimal solution, the number of endogenous
variables implies that the dimension of the corresponding Jacobian matrix does not
allow us to solve analytically for the eigenvalues in order to assess the stability
of the system so that we have decided to rely on numerical methods. However,
our objective here is not to describe completely the dynamics of the model but to
show that for realistic values of the parameters, endogenous fluctuations can still be
present implying the breakdown of sustainability criteria even in the optimal case.
In general, optimal solutions are characterized by monotic convergence in the one-
sector overlapping generation model. This is however only true if the utility function
is separable accross generations and periods of life. When the utility function is non-
separable across periods of life, Michel and Venditti (1996) have shown that optimal
paths can be characterized by endogenous fluctuations under the form of optimal
two-cycles. Concerning, non-separability accross generations which is also the case
in the present framework, de la Croix and Michel (1999) have shown that local
converging oscillations are a possible outcome in the optimal case. We will now
proceed with our numerical simulations in two cases: with and without a social
discount factor.
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Table 1: Value for the parameters
Parameter Value
A 10
α 0.33
β 0.8 or 1
θ 0.6
δ 0.25
η 0.15
ξ 0.2
χ 0.4
b 0.2
γ 0.65
Most of the parameters do not need further comments. The reader should just
notice that in order to respect the necessary condition for a positive steady-state
in the competitive equilibrium case, the ratio χ/ξ should be lower than 2.33 given
that α = 0.33 so that we choose a ratio equal to 2 with ξ = 0.2 and χ = 0.4. We
also choose to focus on a quite high levels of habits with γ = 0.65 which increases
the probability to obtain endogenous fluctuations. We simulate our model during
200 periods in each case. The results concerning the eigenvalues for the case where
β = 0.8 are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Eigenvalues β = 0.8
Modulus Real Imaginary
1.038e-16 -1.038e-16 0
0.6036 0.5763 0.1795
0.6036 0.5763 -0.1795
2.071 1.977 0.6159
2.071 1.977 -0.6159
In this case the sytem exhibits damped oscillations and thus convergence to the
steady-state implying that intergenerational inequalities are present in the short
run. We will now simulate the model when β = 1 in order to see if the no discount-
ing case can generate monotonic convergence toward the steady-state. The results
are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Eigenvalues β = 1
Modulus Real Imaginary
3.987e-15 -3.987e-15 0
0.6504 0.6385 0.124
0.6504 0.6385 -0.124
1.538 1.509 0.2932
1.538 1.509 -0.2932
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As before, we are in the presence of damped oscillations such that even in the no
discounting case, the optimal solution can exhibit intergenerational inequalities in
the short run implying the breakdown of several sustainability criteria such as non-
decreasing utility.
2.6 Decentralizing the optimal solution
A policy intervention should focus on three objectives: adjust adult’s consumption
correcting for habits, adjust savings in order to reach the modified golden rule and
adjusting old age consumption correcting for pollution accumulation. As we will
see shortly, these objectives can be reached by subsidizing or taxing savings and
by subsidizing maintenance investment. A different policy based for example on
a value-added tax could be possible, however, in order to be able to compare our
policy to the case without pollution studied in de la Croix and Michel (1999) we
choose to rely on a similar policy. Let’s denote the gross investment subsidy by it
such that it − 1 is the net subsidy. A negative net subsidy would imply a taxation
on savings. The gross maintenance investment subsidy is lt such that as before the
net one is lt−1. We also use lump-sum transfers to the adult, gt, and to the old, nt.
The maximization problem of the individual becomes
max
ct,dt+1,st,mt
θ ln(ct − γht) + δ ln(dt+1) + η ln(Et+1) (2.68)
subject to 
wt + gt = ct + st +mt
dt+1 = Rt+1it+1st + nt+1
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − χ(ct + dt) + ξltmt
ct, dt+1, st,mt ≥ 0
We then obtain the following first order conditions:
δRt+1
dt+1
it+1 =
θ
ct − γht −
ηχ
Et+1
(2.69)
η(χ+ ξlt)
Et+1
=
θ
ct − γht (2.70)
Proposition 3:
In order to decentralize the first best solution, investment should be taxed or sub-
sidized while maintenance investment should always be subsidized.
Proof. The gross investment subsidy should satisfy
it+1 = 1 +
βd∗t
δ
(
βθγ
c∗t+1 − γc∗t
− ηχ
E∗t+1
)
(2.71)
We cannot ensure that this expression is higher than one such that it might be
necessary to tax savings in order to decentralize the optimal solution.
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The gross maintenance investment subsidy is
lt = 1 +
E∗t+1
ηξ
[
βθγ
c∗t+1 − γc∗t
+
δ(1− b)
d∗t+1
]
> 1 (2.72)
This result imply that the net maintenance investment subsidy lt − 1 is always
positive no matter the value of parameters. Contrary to what could be thought the
policy is not forward looking since c∗t+1, d
∗
t+1 and E
∗
t+1 can be defined from the first
order conditions and the law of motion for environmental quality.
The decentralization of the first best solution is completed by the following lump-
sum transfers:
gt = k
∗
t+1 + c
∗
t +m
∗
t − w∗t (2.73)
nt = −gt − (it − 1)R∗tk∗t − (lt − 1)m∗t (2.74)
Equation (2.73) ensures that the capital stock is set at the level of the modified
golden rule while equation (2.74) is the planner’s budget constraint.
The possibility of taxing capital is closely related to the influence of environmental
quality on the investment subsidy. As can be seen from equation (2.72) if the future
level of environmental quality is too low or if either the relative preference for en-
vironmental quality η or the parameter governing the impact of total consumption
on environmental quality χ are too large investment shoud be taxed.
Concerning the social discount factor, a relatively high value for β implies that we
discount less the utility of future generations. This induces an increase in the in-
vestment subsidy in order to accumulate more capital for future generations. This
is coupled with an increase in the maintenance investment subsidy to compensate
for future environmental degradation. In any case, the two instruments are always
implemented together in order to correct the intergenerational externality linked to
old age consumption and adult’s overconsumption implied by habits.
The fact that both instruments are implemented together provides an economic intu-
ition concerning the existence of oscillations. The necessary increase in maintenance
investment in the optimal case coupled with the existence of habits exerts a negative
effect on capital accumulation which can generate cyclical behavior. This is even
more the case if the optimal policy suggests that investment should be taxed.
The possibility of taxing investment in the present model is also closely related to
the fact that capital is indirectly responsable environmental degradation. Here we
do not take into account the possibility of having a clean sector from which capital
could also be accumulated. Concerning the behavior of actual economies, the policy
would only imply taxing investment devoted to polluting activities such that the
message conveyed might be less pessimistic concerning capital accumulation if clean
technologies become available.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the overlapping generations literature by introduc-
ing habits in consumption in a model with environmental quality and maintenance
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investment. By reducing the initial three dimensional system to a planar one, we
were able to greatly simplify the dynamic analysis. In the present case, the steady-
state capital stock might be higher or lower compared with the standard Diamond
framework depending on the value of the parameters.
Concerning the dynamic behavior of the model, we were able to identify both short
and long term fluctuations implying the breakdown of several sustainability crite-
ria which value intergenerational equality. The short term fluctuations arise due
to the possibility of converging local oscillations around the steady-state while the
long term ones arise trough the possibility of limit-cycles with the appearance of a
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.
We also studied the optimal solution which converges to the modified golden rule for
the capital stock and is clearly different from the competitive outcome in terms of
consumption and environmental quality allocation. Moreover, in the no discounting
case, the steady-state solution is independent of the habit parameter. The latter
can be reached by using the original Ramsey formulation as the objective of the
planner. However, we found evidence suggesting that the optimal outcome can still
be characterized by short-run fluctuations even in this case which led us to conclude
that if we use a standard welfare function without any sustainability constraint, we
are able to solve for the environmental externalities but not for the sustainability
issue. We then proceed to derive an optimal policy allowing for the decentralization
of the first best solution. This one is characterized by a tax or a subsidy on invest-
ment and by a subsidy to maintenance investment.
Further reaserch could try to introduce in this kind of models an appropriate sus-
tainability constraint (or to modify the objective function of the planner) in order
to avoid an outcome with persistent intergenerational inequalities.
Other important issues are the possible combination of habits in both consumption
and environmental quality and the inclusion of a non-polluting sector from where
capital could also be accumulated.
Chapter 3
Discounting, consumption
externalities and growth
3.1 Introduction
The present paper explores the implication that individual time preferences can
be affected by individual wealth as well as by social forces which are not under
the control of the agent. A related idea has already been exploited in the endoge-
nous discounting litterature where the discount rate is not considered as constant
anymore but can depend on individual consumption (Epstein 1987, Obsfelt 1990,
Drugeon 1996, 1998, Das 2003) or individual capital (Schumacher 2009, 2011, Stru-
lik 2012) to cite some examples. The debate concerning the link between wealth
and discounting is an old one and can be related to the work of Fisher (1930) who
conceived a positive link between individual wealth and the valuation of the future.
Empirical evidence has by now confirmed that the discount rate is in fact decreasing
in wealth accumulation (Haussman 1979, Lawrance 1991, Samwick 1998, Frederick
and al. 2002). There are several possible explanations for this but important ones
are the fact that higher wealth is correlated with lower mortality rates (for example
through better health standards) allowing for a higher valuation of the future (Field-
ling and al. 2009, Grossman 2003, Richards and Barry 1998) and that the ability
to enjoy possible future utility gains might be restricted for poorer agents which
need to focus on present issues (Becker and Mulligan 1997). The empirical evidence
thus suggests that the discount rate should depend on some variable reflecting this
wealth effect. Along this line, Schumacher (2009, 2011) builds an optimal growth
model where the discount rate is a decreasing function of the individual capital level.
Our objective is to build on this idea by introducing external effects and study the
implications on both the competitive equilibrium and the optimal outcome. The
discount rate might indeed not only depend on variables under the control of the
agent. The effect of social forces on individual time preferences was already em-
phasized by economist such as Rae (1834) and Fisher (1930) who highlighted the
potiential connections between capital accumulation and culture. On the empirical
side, Easterlin (1995) shows that reported satisfaction does not necessarly increase
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with economic development suggesting that agents might be affected by their rela-
tive position concerning consumption levels. Clark, Oswald and Warr (1996) also
present empirical evidence concerning British workers, showing that their satisfac-
tion is inversely related to comparison wage rates suggesting a similar mechanism.
Evidence thus indicates that comparison of income or consumption might play an
important role in the growth process. Authors such as Shi (1999), Dupor and Liu
(2003) or Meng (2006) have built theoretical models where average consumption
decreases the agent’s lifetime utility, an idea related to jealousy or fashion effects.
Our idea is similar and is based on a discount rate increasing in average consump-
tion inducing a lower valuation of the future. However, in our opinion, the influence
of average consumption might not be limited to time preferences. In the present
article, we would like to introduce a specific type of production externality which is
also related to average consumption. The idea being that living standards (reflected
trough average consumption) determine at least partially individuals’ productive ef-
ficiency. Concrete examples can be related to the covering of basic needs and better
access to health and nutrition standards. The effect is then to increase individual
productivities which will have a positive impact on the aggregate production func-
tion. This possibility has only been explored in the litterature in two contributions
by Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1991) and Drugeon (1998). In this way, we allow
consumption to play a different role than in standard models where it always acts
as an impediment in the growth process. In the present framework, it is actually
possible that consumption enhances capital accumulation.
The paper will mostly focus on the implications concerning equilibrium dynam-
ics. In the present case the equilibrium might not be unique (a feature already
present in the case without externalities) but moreover we face the possibility of
local indeterminacies and local bifurcations. As shown by Woodford (1986), local
indeterminacies imply the existence of stationnary sunspot equilibria which repre-
sent an alternative way to explain economic fluctuations (see the early works of
Shell 1977, Azariadis 1981, Azariadis and Guesnerie 1981, Cass and Shell 1983). In
the indeterminacy case, two economies with an identical initial capital stock will
converge to the same steady-state equilibrium, however, the transitory growth rates
depend on the initial value of consumption which can be chosen freely and might
be influenced by cultural, social or historical factors which are not related to the
economy’s fundamentals. This implies the existence of a continuum of equilibrium
growth paths leading to the same steady-state equilibrium in the long run. A large
part of the indeterminacy litterature is based on the assumption of increasing re-
turns or production externalities as can be seen in the works of Benhabib and Farmer
(1994, 1999). In our framework, indeterminacy can only arise if discounting exter-
nalities are present while the existence of a unique indeterminate steady-state is
only possible when both kind of externalities are present and are sufficiently large.
Given the presence of production externalities, the model is also able to generate
endogenous growth with a unique balanced-growth path which is always indetermi-
nate. Concerning local bifurcations, we study the possible existence of limit-cycles
as well as sudden changes in the number of steady-states or the exchange of stability
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properties between two steady-states. While limit-cycles can be associated to long
run fluctuations around the steady-state, the other two two types of bifurcations
can be associated to sudden economic take-offs or depressions (Azariadis 1993).
We then proceed with the study of the optimal outcome which shows that on the
dynamic side saddle-path stability prevails suggesting that local indeterminacies and
endogenous fluctuations entail a welfare loss in the competitive case. Moreover, the
comparison between the optimal and the competitive case allows us to design a po-
tential policy. It is shown that the marginal cost of a unit of consumption is higher in
the optimal case if production externalities are not too large. This result is directly
related to the effect of discounting externalities and implies that the representative
agent does not save enough in the competitive case. If the effect of production ex-
ternalities decreases along the development process, an adequate policy might need
to implement a consumption subsidy at low stages of development in order to take
advantage of the potential large externalities in the production function and move
gradually toward an investment subsidy or a consumption tax policy as the economy
develops.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the competitive frame-
work and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of multiple
steady-states. The model with only one type of externality at a time is presented
in section 3 while the full model with both type of externalities is at the heart of
section 4. Section 5 explores the possibility of endogenous growth while the optimal
solution with its steady-state and dynamics properties are presented in section 6.
The last section is then devoted to the conclusion.
3.2 The model
The model is a direct extension of the one-sector neoclassical growth model where the
economy is composed by a large number of identical individuals, normalized to one
and seeking to maximize their intertemporal discounted utility. The discount factor
is however endogenous and depends on the historical paths of capital and average
consumption. The intertemporal discounted utility function is the following:
U(c, k) =
∫ ∞
0
u(ct)e
−
∫ t
0
ρ(kτ ,cτ )dτdt (3.1)
where ct is the level of consumption of the representative agent at time t, u(ct) is
the felicity function, kt is the individual level of capital, ct is the average level of
consumption and ρ(k, c) is the subjective discount rate function.
Assumption 1:
(i) The utility function u(c) is twice continuously differentiable and has the following
properties: u(c) > 0, u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0 and limc→0 u′(c) =∞.
(ii) The discount rate ρ(k, c) is twice continuously differentiable and has the fol-
lowing properties: ρ(k, c) > 0, ρk(k, c) < 0, ρkk(k, c) > 0 and ρc(k, c) > 0.
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Assumption 1 together with specification (3.1) imply that the intertemporal util-
ity is positively affected by individual capital accumulation. Following the idea of
Fisher (1930), an increase in wealth implies a higher valuation of the future. On
the contrary, in a way related to Shi (1999) and Dupor and Liu (2003), average
consumption affects negatively intertemporal utility by implying a lower valuation
of the future. The discount rate function is moreover convex in individual capital.
The representative agent accumulates wealth by renting the amount of capital he
owns at time t at the rate rt and by supplying inelastically one unit of labor at the
wage rate wt. Given an initial level of capital k0, the representative agent maximizes
(1) subject to the following budget constraint:
k˙t = (rt − δ)kt + wt − ct (3.2)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The single good is produced by a pro-
duction function F (k, l, c) which uses capital and labor as inputs and is influenced
by average consumption.
Assumption 2:
The production function F (k, l, c) exhibits constant returns to scale in k and l, is
increasing and concave in k, l and increasing in c.
We can rewrite the production function in intensive form as f(kt, ct) and we also
have fk(kt, ct) > 0, fc(kt, ct) > 0 and fkk(kt, ct) < 0 implying that average con-
sumption affects positively individual productivities. We moreover assume that
fkc(kt, ct) = fck(kt, ct) > 0. This assumption is intuitive if we believe that consump-
tion externalities might play an important role in the production process.
Since we assume perfect competition in factor markets, we know that rt = fk(kt, ct)
and wt = f(kt, ct)− fk(kt, ct)kt so that the budget constraint can be replaced by:
k˙ = f(kt, ct)− ct − δkt (3.3)
The fact that the discount rate θt =
∫ t
0 ρ(kτ , cτ )dτ is not constant implies that we
have to rely on Uzawa’s virtual time method. In order to do so we define an implicit
function t = p(θ) where p′ = 1
ρ(kθ,cθ)
and use θ as an alternative independent variable
(a virtual time) so that
dt =
dθ
ρ(kθ, cθ)
(3.4)
The new problem is the following:
max
cθ,kθ
∫ ∞
0
u(cθ)e
−θ
ρ(kθ, cθ)
dθ (3.5)
subject to: 
k˚ = dkθ
dθ
= f(kθ,cθ)−cθ−δkθ
ρ(kθ,cθ)
0 < cθ ≤ f(kθ)
with k0 > 0 given
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The present-value Hamiltonian is:
H = 1
ρ(kθ, cθ)
{
u(cθ)e
−θ + λθ [f(kθ, cθ)− cθ − δkθ]
}
(3.6)
The first-order necessary conditions are:
u′(cθ)e−θ = λθ (3.7)
−λ˚ = −ρk(kθ, cθ)
ρ(kθ, cθ)
H + λθ
[
fk(kθ, cθ)− δ
ρ(kθ, cθ)
]
(3.8)
lim
θ→∞
λθkθ = 0 (3.9)
To eliminate λθ, one proceeds by taking the derivative of equation (3.7) with respect
to the virtual time variable θ and obtains:
u′(cθ)e−θ − u′′(cθ)e−θc˚ = −λ˚ (3.10)
By noting that c˚ = c˙/ρ(kt, ct) and k˚ = k˙/ρ(kt, ct) and rearranging, we obtain the
following dynamical system at the competitive equilibrium (dropping time subscripts
for convenience):
c˙ = − u
′(c)
u′′(c)
[
fk(k, c)− δ − ρ(k, c)− ρk(k, c)
ρ(k, c)
(
u(c)
u′(c)
+ k˙
)]
(3.11)
k˙ = f(k, c)− c− δk (3.12)
These two equations are similar to the ones obtained by Schumacher (2009, 2011)
and Strulik (2012) except that in our case the discount rate and the production
function now depend directly on consumption. This will of course affect the steady-
state solution and the dynamics of the model.
The steady-state equations are given by:
fk(k, c)− δ − ρ(k, c) = ρk(k, c)
ρ(k, c)
u(c)
u′(c)
(3.13)
f(k, c)− δk = c (3.14)
As can be seen from the last two expressions, both type of consumption externali-
ties play a role in determining the steady-state. Our next step will now consist in
studying the existence of positive steady-state equilibria. We first let the equality
f(k, c)−δk = c define for fc−1 6= 0 an implicit function c = g(k) where g′ = −fk−δfc−1 .
In the following, we drop the variables on which each function depends, but these
remain the same as before.
Proposition 1:
A sufficient condition for the existence of a unique positive competitive equilibrium
steady-state is:
fkk < ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.15)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
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∀k and where c = g(k).
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of multiple competitive equi-
librium steady-states is that ∃k > 0 which solves fk − δ − ρk = ρkρ uu′ where c = g(k)
and for this value of k, we have:
fkk > ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.16)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
Proof. We use the steady-state equations (3.13) and (3.14). We are concerned with
values of k < k where k solves f = δk, so that we can focus on the interval k ∈]0, k[.
We then define G(k) = A(k)−B(k) where A(k) = fk − δ− ρ and B(k) = ρkρ uu′ with
c = g(k).
We know that limk→0G(k) =∞ and limk→kG(k) = z < 0 where z is a negative but
finite number. Moreover:
G′(k) = fkk − ρk −
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.17)
−
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
where c = g(k). A sufficient condition for a unique steady-state is that G(k) = 0
only for one k. This is the case when G′(k) < 0, ∀k. Multiple steady-state equilibria
can only arise if G(k) changes sign after being negative. A necessary and sufficient
condition is then that ∃k such that for this value of k, G(k) = 0 and G′(k) > 0
which gives the desired result.
Given the characteristics of the function G(k), our model will always feature
an odd number of steady-states. The possibility of multiple steady-state equilibria
implies that we might face a situation where initial conditions (reflected in the
initial level of capital k0) play a crucial role concerning the steady-state to which
the economy will converge in the long run. An economy lagging behind might never
be able to catch up implying the existence of what is now known as a poverty trap.
This can still be true even if the lagging economy is experimenting faster growth
for some time during the transition due to the intrinsic unsustainable nature of its
equilibrium path. In order to ensure that the possibility of multiple equilibria is not
just a theoretical curiosity, we now give a relatively general example where multiple
equilibria can arise.
Example 1 : The production function is of the CES type and is given by F (K,L, c) =
[αK− + (1 − α)(cL)−]−1/ so that the effect of labor on the production function
also depends on the consumption level. In intensive form, we obtain f(k, c) =
[αk−+(1−α)c−]−1/ where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and  ≥ −1. The utility function is given by
u(c) = c1−σ/(1−σ) where σ < 1 while the discount function is of the Cobb-Douglas
form and is given by ρ(k, c) = k−βcη where β ≥ 0 and η ≥ 0. Finally we assume
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that the depreciation rate of capital is equal to zero. A solution satisfying both
steady-state equations is k = [α + β/(1 − σ)]1/(η−β). In this case, condition (3.16)
is equivalent to (β − η)[α + β/(1 − σ)](η−β−1)/(η−β) > 0 which is always satisfied if
β > η. In this specific example, if the elasticity of the discount function with respect
to capital is larger than the one with respect to consumption, we obtain multiple
steady-state equilibria.
In order to see the influence of both type of externalities concerning existence and
dynamic behavior, we will first study the model with one externality at a time.
3.3 The model with one externality at a time
3.3.1 The ρc = 0 and fc > 0 case
We start by considering the sufficient condition (3.15) in the case without external-
ities affecting the discount rate. The condition becomes:
fkk < ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.18)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)u
′′
u′
]
We can notice that the last term between brackets on the right hand side of condition
(3.18) is positive so that if fc − 1 > 0, consumption externalities in the production
function increase the possibility of facing a unique equilibrium since fkk < 0 and
ρk < 0. The economic interpretation of fc−1 > 0 is that an increase in consumption
will enhance capital accumulation contrary to the standard case where consumption
acts as an impediment in the growth process. This implies that relatively large pro-
duction externalities might help economies to escape the poverty trap induced by
endogenous discounting. Schumacher (2009) has shown that an exogenous increase
in productivity might allow economies to escape poverty traps when the discount
rate is decreasing in capital accumulation. By increasing individual productivities,
average consumption plays a similar role in the present framework. The increase in
production due to average consumption pushes the capital stock upwards and by
extension reduces the discount rate. This in turn creates an incentive toward further
capital accumulation.
Now, if fc − 1 < 0, the conclusion is reversed and relatively low consumption ex-
ternalities in the production function coupled with a discount rate decreasing in
capital accumulation might result more easily in multiple steady-state equilibria. In
this case, an increase in consumption still exerts a negative impact on capital accu-
mulation and thus does not imply a decrease in the discount rate. Notice that the
result would be equivalent if fc < 0 such that the presence of negative production
externalities would also increase the probability of facing multiple equilibria.
We will now proceed with the study of the dynamic behavior of the model in this
case. In order to do so, we linearize our dynamical system around the steady-state
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(c∗, k∗). We then obtain:(
c˙
k˙
)
=
(
∂c˙
∂c
∂c˙
∂k
∂k˙
∂c
∂k˙
∂k
) ∣∣∣∣
c˙=0,k˙=0
(
c− c∗
k − k∗
)
where
∂c˙
∂c
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = ρ+ δ − fk −
u′
u′′
(
fkc − ρk
ρ
fc
)
(3.19)
∂c˙
∂k
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = −
u′
u′′
[
fkk − ρk − ρk
ρ
(fk − δ)−
(
ρkkρ− ρ2k
ρ2
)
u
u′
]
(3.20)
∂k˙
∂c
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = fc − 1 (3.21)
∂k˙
∂k
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = fk − δ (3.22)
In this case, the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are given by:
Tr(J) = ρ− u
′
u′′
(
fkc − ρk
ρ
fc
)
(3.23)
Det(J) = (fk − δ)
[
ρ+ δ − fk − u
′
u′′
(
fkc − ρk
ρ
)]
(3.24)
+
u′
u′′
(fc − 1)
[
fkk − ρk −
(
ρkkρ− ρ2k
ρ2
)
u
u′
]
A first thing to be noticed is that if fc and fkc take positive values, indeterminacy
is not a possible outcome of the model since the trace can only take positive values.
Positive production externalities and an increasing interest rate in consumption ex-
ert a destabilizing effect on the dynamical system by pushing upward the trace of
the Jacobian matrix and thus not allowing for indeterminacy in this version of the
model. We thus obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1:
(i) Consider the case where fc − 1 > 0, if at the steady-state:
fkk > ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.25)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)u
′′
u′
]
Then, the competitive equilibrium is saddle-path stable and unstable otherwise.
(ii) Consider the case where fc − 1 < 0, if at the steady-state:
fkk < ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.26)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)u
′′
u′
]
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Then, the competitive equilibrium is saddle-path stable and unstable otherwise.
Remembering the results from proposition 1, we can see that in the case of a unique
steady-state, if fc − 1 > 0, this unique equilibrium will be unstable while in the
case of multiple equilibria, instability will alternate with saddle-path stability. In
the opposite case, that is when fc − 1 < 0, if we are in the presence of a unique
steady-state, this equilibrium will be saddle-path stable while in the multiple equi-
libria case, saddle-path stability will alternate with instability. When there are no
discounting externalities it thus seems necessary to assume moderate production
externalities (implying that consumption still acts as an impediment in the growth
process) in order to obtain a unique steady-state which is saddle-path stable.
The reasonning concerning this result goes as follows, we start with the situation
where fc − 1 > 0. Intuitively, if everyone’s consumption (average consumption)
is higher on any given date, production will also be higher and since fc − 1 > 0,
consumption exerts a positive effect on capital accumulation which decreases the dis-
count rate. This will in turn induce further savings and higher average consumption
in the future. In this case, no equilibrium path starting away from the steady-state
can locally converge. If fc − 1 < 0, the positive effect of consumption on capital
accumulation is not present and the economy will converge to a steady-state.
We will now focus in the next subsection on the case without production externali-
ties.
3.3.2 The ρc > 0 and fc = 0 case
We now consider condition (3.15) without production externalities. The condition
then becomes:
fkk < ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.27)
+[fk − δ]
[
ρc +
ρk
ρ
+ (ρ+ δ − fk)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
As can be seen from the previous condition, an increase in ρc, corresponding to
higher discouting externalities will increase the right hand side of expression (3.27)
implying that a unique steady-state equilibrium is more probable. By increasing the
discount rate, average consumption offsets at least partially the effect of individual
capital on the discount rate. Economies with different initial capital levels will have
more similar discount rates increasing the possibility of reaching a unique positive
steady-state equilibrium.
We can now proceed as before by linearizing the model around the steady-state. We
obtain the following expressions for the elements of the Jacobian matrix:
∂c˙
∂c
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = ρ+ δ − fk +
u′
u′′
ρc +
(
ρkcρ− ρkρc
ρ2
)
u
u′′
(3.28)
∂c˙
∂k
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = −
u′
u′′
[
fkk − ρk − ρk
ρ
(fk − δ)−
(
ρkkρ− ρ2k
ρ2
)
u
u′
]
(3.29)
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∂k˙
∂c
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = −1 (3.30)
∂k˙
∂k
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = fk − δ (3.31)
In this case, the trace and the determinant are given by:
Tr(J) = ρ+
u′
u′′
ρc
(
1− ρku
ρu′
)
+
uρkc
u′′ρ2
(3.32)
Det(J) = − u
′
u′′
[
fkk − ρk − u
u′
(
ρkkρ− ρ2k
ρ2
)]
(3.33)
+(fk − δ)
[
ρ+ δ − fk + u
′
u′′
(
ρc +
ρk
ρ
)
+
u
u′′
(
ρkcρ− ρkρc
ρ2
)]
We can now formulate a proposition concerning the dynamic behavior of the model
in this case.
Proposition 2.2:
If at the steady-state:
ρ+
uρkc
u′′ρ2
< − u
′
u′′
ρc
(
1− ρku
ρu′
)
(3.34)
fkk > ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.35)
+[fk − δ]
[
ρc +
ρk
ρ
+ (ρ+ δ − fk)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
Then, the competitive equilibrium is locally indeterminate and there is a continuum
of equilibrium growth paths converging to the same steady-state.
If at the steady-state:
fkk < ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.36)
+[fk − δ]
[
ρc +
ρk
ρ
+ (ρ+ δ − fk)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
Then, the competitive equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
In any other configuration, the steady-state is unstable.
Using once again, the results from proposition 1, we can observe that in the case
of a unique steady-state, the equilibrium will be saddle-path stable while if we have
multiple equilibria saddle-path stability will alternate with indeterminacy or insta-
bility depending on the sign of the trace of the Jacobian matrix. As can be seen
from expression (3.32), indeterminacy can only arise if discounting externalities are
relatively large implying a negative trace. In this case, discounting externalities play
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a stabilizing role by pushing the trace toward negative values.
To see more clearly how indeterminacy works in the present specification, let’s con-
sider that we start from an equilibrium growth path. Suppose that when an agent
is optimistic about the fact that is permanent income will be higher (since the dis-
count rate is decreasing in capital accumulation), he decides to increase its initial
consumption level thus jumping onto a new equilibrium path. In our representative
agent framework, all agents will behave in the same way thus increasing average
consumption. Since ρc > 0, the discount rate applied to future utility will be higher
inducing a lower valuation of the future. If the discounting externality is sufficiently
strong, accumulation will shrink and the new equilibrium path can be a convergent
one.
In this version of the model however, indeterminacy cannot arise in the case of a
unique steady-state, since higher discounting externalities tend to push the deter-
minant toward negative values and thus saddle-path stability. As we will see in
the next section, it is the combination of both type of externalities that is able to
generate a unique steady-state which is locally indeterminate.
3.4 The full model
We can now proceed with the dynamic analysis of the model when both type of
externalities are present by linearizing the system around the steady-state. We
obtain the following expressions for the elements of the Jacobian matrix:
∂c˙
∂c
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = ρ+ δ − fk −
u′
u′′
(
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
fc
)
(3.37)
+
u
u′′
(
ρkcρ− ρkρc
ρ2
)
∂c˙
∂k
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = −
u′
u′′
[
fkk − ρk − ρk
ρ
(
fk − δ − uρk
u′ρ
)
− uρkk
u′ρ
]
(3.38)
∂k˙
∂c
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = fc − 1 (3.39)
∂k˙
∂k
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = fk − δ (3.40)
In this case, the trace and the determinant are given by:
Tr(J) = ρ− u
′
u′′
(
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
fc
)
+
u
u′′
(
ρkcρ− ρkρc
ρ2
)
(3.41)
Det(J) = − u
′
u′′
(fc − 1)
[
fkk − ρk − u
u′
(
ρkkρ− ρ2k
ρ2
)]
(3.42)
+(fk − δ)
[
ρ+ δ − fk − u
′
u′′
(
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
)]
+(fk − δ)
(
ρkcρ− ρkρc
ρ2
)
u
u′′
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We now have a proposition concerning the dynamics of the full-model. We will dis-
tinguish between the cases where fc − 1 > 0 and fc − 1 < 0.
Proposition 2.3:
(i) Consider the case where fc − 1 > 0, if at the steady-state:
u′′ >
u′
ρ
[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
fc − u
u′
(
ρkcρ− ρkρc
ρ2
)]
(3.43)
fkk < ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.44)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
Then, the equilibrium is locally indeterminate and there is a continuum of equilib-
rium growth paths converging to the same steady-state.
If
fkk > ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.45)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
Then, the steady-state is saddle-path stable and there is a unique equilibrium growth
path converging to the steady-state.
In any other case, the equilibrium is unstable.
(ii) Consider the case where fc − 1 < 0, if at the steady-state
u′′ >
u′
ρ
[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
fc − u
u′
(
ρkcρ− ρkρc
ρ2
)]
(3.46)
fkk > ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.47)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
Then, the equilibrium is locally indeterminate.
If
fkk < ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.48)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
Then, the equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
In any other case, the equilibrium is unstable.
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As can be seen immediately, if fc − 1 > 0, the condition for a positive determi-
nant is exactly the same as the condition for the existence of a unique steady-state
equilibrium. If we only have one steady-state equilibrium, that the trace of the
Jacobian matrix is negative (the reader should notice that this is only possible if
discounting externalities are large enough), then it is locally indeterminate since
the determinant is positive in this case. In the case of multiple steady-states, the
equilibria will alternate between local indeterminacy or instability depending on the
sign of the trace and saddle-path stability. From both inequalities we can notice
that the condition on the trace is equivalent to a restriction on the concavity of the
utility function while the condition on the determinant is equivalent to a restriction
on the concavity of the production function. While the utility function should not
be too concave in order to ensure a negative trace, the production function should
be concave enough in capital in order to obtain multiple equilibria coupled with
local indeterminacies.
If fc − 1 < 0, we are back to a more standard result where in the case of a unique
steady-state, saddle-path stability will prevail. Concerning multiple steady-states,
saddle-path stability will alternate with indeterminacy or instability. Production
and discounting externalities thus play a fundamental role concerning the dynamic
behavior of the model. If production externalities imply that an increase in con-
sumption has a positive effect on capital accumulation, indeterminacy might appear
for odd steady-states while in the opposite case indeterminacy might appear for
even steady-states provided that discounting externalities are large enough so that
the trace of the Jacobian matrix takes negative values. The existence of a unique
indeterminate steady-state thus requires relatively large external effects concerning
both the production function and the discount rate.
In order to see how indeterminacy works in the full model, we start as before from
an equilibrium path. Suppose that an optimistic agent about the fact that is perma-
nent income will be higher (since ρk < 0) decides to increase its initial consumption
level thus jumping onto a new equilibrium growth path. In our representative agent
model, this will increase production as well as the discount rate trought the average
consumption channel. Without the influence of discounting externalities, this equi-
librium would be unstable due to over-accumulation implied by a decreasing discount
rate and an increasing production level. However, in this case, discounting external-
ities play a stabilizing role by inducing the agent to value less future consumption
and increasing present one. This will lead to a reversal of over-accumulation and the
new equilibrium path can be a convergent one. Indeterminacy is thus the result of
two opposing forces: while ρk and fc act as a destabilizing force, ρc acts as a stabi-
lizing one. This also explains why without the inclusion of discounting externalities,
the model can only generate saddle-path stable or unstable steady-states.
As can be noticed from our previous results, the importance of production externali-
ties plays a crucial role concerning the possibility of indeterminacy. Large production
externalities (such that fc−1 > 0) might in fact be compatible only with increasing
returns to scale. In order to tackle this issue we will work with a CES production
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function with increasing returns. Our objective is to observe in which case increas-
ing returns are needed in order to ensure that fc − 1 > 0 at the steady-state. The
production function is the following:
F (K,L, c) = [αK− + (1− α)(Lc)−]− τ
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,  ≥ −1 and τ ≥ 1 is the degree of increasing returns. Once again,
in accordance with our assumption, the effect of labour on the production function
also depends on the consumption level. In intensive form, we obtain:
f(k, c) = [αk− + (1− α)c−]− τ
Using the second steady-state equation (3.14), we know that at the steady-state:
αk− + (1− α)c− = (c+ δk)− τ (3.49)
Concerning the marginal productivity of consumption, it is given by:
fc(k, c) = τ [αk
− + (1− α)c−]− (τ+) (1− α)c−(+1) (3.50)
fc(k, c) = τ(c+ δk)
τ+
τ (1− α)c−(+1) (3.51)
The elasticity of substitution is given by µ = 1/(1 + ) and we start with  = −1 so
that k and c are perfect subtitutes. In this case, fc > 1 if:
τ(c+ δk)
τ−1
τ (1− α) > 1 (3.52)
The previous condition implies that increasing returns are necessary in this case in
order to obtain large production externalities. This can be confirmed by rewriting
the previous condition without increasing returns such that τ = 1. In this case the
condition is equivalent to 1− α > 1 which is ruled out by assumption. We now set
 = +∞ so that k and c are perfect complements and compute a similar condition:
τ(1− α) lim
→+∞(c+ δk)
τ+
τ > lim
→+∞ c
(+1) (3.53)
In this case, increasing returns are not necessary to obtain large production external-
ities. Once again we can confirm this by rewriting the condition without increasing
returns. The condition becomes:
(1− α) lim
→+∞(1 +
δk
c
)(+1) > 1 (3.54)
which is always true if δk/c > 0. We can thus conclude that in order to avoid large
increasing returns and still obtain large consumption externalities, a certain degree
of complementarity between k and c is necessary in the present framework. The re-
sult is particulary intuitive since in the case of complementarity, consumption plays
an important role in the production process implying that its marginal impact can
be large while it is actually the contrary when capital and consumption are closed
substitutes.
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A last point concerning transitional dynamics in the present model is that they
might not exhibit a monotonic behavior but possibly an oscillatory one. Complex
dynamics of this sort will only occur if we are in the presence of a pair of complex
eigenvalues. A direct implication is that the following condition should be fulfilled:
Tr(J)2 < 4Det(J). Since the determinant should be positive, we can only observe
this situation in the case of indeterminacy or instability. The dynamical system will
then exhibit local oscillations converging or not to the steady-state equilibrium.
The dynamic analysis concerning hyperbolic steady-state equilibria is now complete.
However, in the present model, the steady-state might not always be hyperbolic. In
this particular case, we cannot use a linear approximation in order to establish the
stability of our dynamical system. Non-hyperbolic fixed points are nonetheless nat-
ural candidates for the detection of local bifurcations which is the objective of the
forthcoming analysis. In fact, the present model is able to give rise to different
kind of bifurcations. We should first focus on the possible existence of a limit-cycle
through the appearance of a Hopf bifurcation. The dynamical system will then not
converge to a steady-state but undergo permanent oscillations around the steady-
state. Mathematically, a Hopf bifurcation appears if we are in the presence of a
pair of complex eigenvalues with zero real part and the respective crossing condition
of the imaginary axis at non-zero speed is fulfilled. The previous conditions imply
that the trace of our Jacobian matrix should be equal to zero and the determinant
should be positive. The following proposition applies the Hopf bifurcation theorem
to the present dynamical system.
Proposition 3.1:
If fc − 1 > 0, assume that the dynamical system is parametrized by γ where γˆ is
defined from
ρ =
u′
u′′
(
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
fc
)
− u
u′′
(
ρkcρ− ρkρc
ρ2
)
(3.55)
fkk < ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.56)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
Let (cˆ, kˆ) be the fixed point defined by γˆ. At γˆ, the dynamical system admits a pair
of complex eigenvalues {µ, µ} and for dR(µ)/dγ|γ=γˆ 6= 0, there is a neighborhood U
of γˆ for which either for γ < γˆ or γ > γˆ a closed invariant curve Γ encircles (cˆ, kˆ).
If fc − 1 < 0, the second condition becomes
fkk > ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.57)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
and the rest of the proposition follows.
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In order to understand how both short run fluctuations and limit-cycles can appear
in the present model, let’s assume that for a given level of capital kt, accumulation
of capital proceeds. This increase in the capital stock will reduce the discount rate
inducing a higher valuation of the future and further capital accumulation. This
process will ultimately increase average consumption and push the discount rate
and production upwards. If the discounting externalities are sufficiently large, the
following increase in consumption will induce a lower valuation of the future and a
further increase in average consumption. At a certain point in time, accumulation
comes to an end inducing a recession. Once the subsequent reduction in capital
and average consumption is strong enough, the incentives for accumulation appear
once again and an expansion period can start. This process can be temporary as in
the case of converging oscillations or permanent as in the case of a limit-cycle. The
opposite effects of capital and average consumption on the discount rate explain
the result. The presence of permanent fluctuations is particularly interesting since
it is only made possible by the introduction of discounting externalities. Compar-
isons of consumption levels among agents seem thus to be able to play an important
role concerning endogenous fluctuations in the growth process. This fact was al-
ready highlighted for example in an overlapping generation setup by de la Croix
and Michel (1999) where young agents evaluate their consumption against the one
of their parents. In both cases, the mechanism is similar and is based on overcon-
sumption implied by externalities having a depressing effect on capital accumulation.
We now present an example compatible withe existence of a Hopf bifurcation.
Example 2 : we take once again the functional forms of our first example. In this
case, fc−1 < 0 and the condition concerning the determinant of the Jacobian matrix
is equivalent to (β − η)[α + β/(1 − σ)](η−β−1)/(η−β) > 0 which is always satisfied if
β > η. Concerning the condition on the trace we obtain:
(η − σ)
(
α +
β
1− σ
)
= (1− α)[β + α(1 + )] (3.58)
A necessary condition for the last expression to make sense is η > σ so that the
elasticity of the discount function with respect to consumption should be larger
than the elasticity of marginal utility (remember that we have assumed a utility
function defined over the positive domain so that σ < 1). From the last expression
we can define a value for η so that the condition is satisfied:
η =
(1− σ)(1− α)[β + α(1 + )]
α(1− σ) + β + σ (3.59)
This combination of parameters together with the restriction that β > η > σ opens
the door to a Hopf bifurcation provided that the respective crossing condition is
satisfied.
The present framework can also give rise to a different kind of bifurcation. If one
of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix is equal to zero, the system might un-
dergo a saddle-node or a transcritical bifurcation. In the first case, two fixed points
collide and annihilate each other such that we observe a change in the number of
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steady-states. In the second case, the number of steady-states is constant but when
two fixed points collide, they exchange their stability properties. The following
proposition applies the saddle-node and the transcritical bifurcation theorems to
the present dynamical system. In order to do so we first define the Hessian matrix
at the steady-state as H and the matrix M which elements are the partial derivates
of the elements of the Jacobian matrix with respect to γ (where γ parametrizes the
dynamical system).
Proposition 3.2:
Assume that the dynamical system is once again parametrized by γ where γ is
defined from
fkk = ρk +
(
ρkk
ρk
− ρk
ρ
)
(fk − δ − ρ) (3.60)
+
(
fk − δ
fc − 1
)[
fkc − ρc − ρk
ρ
+ (fk − δ − ρ)
(
u′′
u′
+
ρc
ρ
− ρkc
ρk
)]
(i) Let (c, k) be the fixed point defined by γ. At γ, the dynamical system admits
one eigenvalue µ = 0 and for
(
∂c˙/∂γ
∂k˙/∂γ
)
|c˙=0,k˙=0,γ=γ 6= 0 and Det(H)|γ=γ 6= 0, two fixed-
points (one saddle and one node) collide and disappear.
(ii) At γ, the dynamical system admits one eigenvalue µ = 0 and for
(
∂c˙/∂γ
∂k˙/∂γ
)
|c˙=0,k˙=0,γ=γ =
0, Det(H)|γ=γ 6= 0 and Det(M)|γ=γ 6= 0, two fixed-points collide and exchange their
stability properties.
An abrupt change in the number of steady-states or in stability behavior follow-
ing a smooth change in γ can be an interesting feature in the present framework.
This implies that our dynamical system can in a certain way overreact following
an external change in environmental conditions. As explained in Azariadis (1993),
these kind of phenomena can be associated to abrupt changes such as economic
take-offs or depressions. In the present framework where we always have an odd-
number of steady-states, we can suppose for a moment that we face a situation
with three steady-states. In this case, the presence of a saddle-node bifurcation can
allow countries which were stuck in a poverty trap to converge to a higher unique
steady-state after the bifurcation takes place. Similarly, a transcritical bifurcation
can imply that a poverty trap becomes suddenly unstable thus generating an eco-
nomic take-off. Using the functional forms of our two examples, we can observe that
if the elasticities of the discount function with respect to capital (β) and consump-
tion (η) are equal, then the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is equal to zero so
that one of these two bifurcations can potentially arise.
These observations end up the analysis of the dynamics of the model in the sta-
tionnary case. However, the presence of production externalities also generates the
possibility of endogenous growth in the present framework. The study of this po-
tential outcome is the subject of the next section.
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3.5 Competitive balanced growth path
By introducing a second reproducible factor of production, consumption externali-
ties generate the possibility of endogenous growth in the present framework.
Definition 1:
A competitive balanced growth path equilibrium of this economy is a solution (ct, kt)
to equations (3.11) and (3.12) given k0, such that consumption and capital grow at
the common rate g > 0.
In order to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path (BGP) , we need to
impose some restrictions on our functional forms. We first rewrite our dynamical
system in a slightly different form.
c˙
c
= − u
′(c)
u′′(c)c
[
fk(k, c)− δ − ρ(k, c)− ρk(k, c)k
ρ(k, c)
(
c
(1− σ)k +
k˙
k
)]
(3.61)
k˙
k
=
f(k, c)
k
− c
k
− δ (3.62)
From the last two expressions we can derive conditions compatible with the exis-
tence of a competitive BGP.
Proposition 4.1:
A set of sufficient restrictions on preferences and technology compatible with the
existence of a competitive BGP are:
(i) u(c) = (1− σ)−1c1−σ for σ < 1.
(ii) f(k, c) is homogenous of degree one in k and c.
(iii) ρ(k, c) is homogenous of degree zero in k and c.
Proof. From the capital accumulation equation, we notice that since gk = gc =
g along a BGP, f(k, c)/k should also be constant. This is possible if f(k, c) is
homogenous of degree one in k and c leading to
k˙
k
= f(1,
c
k
)− c
k
− δ (3.63)
Considering now the consumption accumulation equation, we first notice that since
f(k, c) is homogenous of degree one, fk(k, c) is homogenous of degree zero ensuring
a constant marginal productivity of capital along a BGP. ρ(k, c) should also be
constant along a BGP implying that ρ(k, c) is restricted to be homogenous of degree
zero. The last term between brackets is constant since gk = gc and since ρk(k, c) is
homogenous of degree minus one. Finally, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
should also be constant in order to obtain a constant growth rate for consumption
such that the utility function is of the CIES form. We then obtain the following law
of motion for consumption.
c˙
c
= − u
′(c)
u′′(c)c
[
fk(1, c/k)− δ − ρ(1, c/k)− ρk(1, c/k)
ρ(1, c/k)
(
c
(1− σ)k +
k˙
k
)]
(3.64)
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While condition (i) restricts the utility function to the positive domain and
ensures a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution, condition (ii) implies
that there are constant returns to scale concerning both reproducible inputs which
is a necessary condition in standard endogenous growth models. Finally, condition
(iii) implies that the increasing effect of average consumption on the discount rate
is totally compensated by the individual capital accumulation effect along the BGP
so that the discount rate is constant.
We now define x = c/k such that the balanced growth paths are solutions to x˙/x =
F (x) = 0 where from expressions (3.61) and (3.62)
F (x) =
1
σ
[
fk(x)− δ − ρ(x)− ρk(x)
ρ(x)
(
x
1− σ + f(x)− x− δ
)]
(3.65)
− (f(x)− x− δ)
F (x) = 0 can be rewritten as a polynomial of order two in the variable ρ(x):
F (x) = −ρ(x)2 + [fk(x)− δ − σ(f(x)− x− δ)]ρ(x) (3.66)
−ρk(x)
(
x
1− σ + f(x)− x− δ
)
= 0
The previous equation describes an inverted U-shaped parabola for which we have
two steady-state solutions since the discrimant is given by:
[fk(x) + δ − σ(f(x)− x− δ)]2 − 4ρk(x)
(
x
1− σ + f(x)− x− δ
)
> 0 (3.67)
The discriminant is always positive given that ρk < 0 and gk > 0 along a BGP
equilibrium. However since ρk < 0, the product of the roots is negative and these
are of opposite sign. We are thus left with a unique BGP solution for which x > 0.
The dynamic behavior of the BGP equilibrium is given by the sign of F ′(x) along
the BGP leading to the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2:
Consider the unique BGP solution x∗ such that F (x∗) = 0:
(i) if F ′(x∗) > 0 the BGP equilibrium is locally unstable (determinate)
(ii) if F ′(x∗) < 0 the BGP equilibrium is locally stable (indeterminate)
(iii) if F ′(x∗) = 0, depending on higher order terms, the BGP equilibrium is either
locally stable or unstable.
The BGP is unstable or determinate in the sense that any initial value x0 6= x∗ will
diverge from x∗. For every k0, there is a unique choice for c0 such that c0/k0 = x∗
and along this unique equilibrium path, consumption and capital grow at the same
constant rate g. Now, if the BGP is indeterminate, for a given k0, any choice for c0
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will generate an equilibrium path converging to x∗. In this case there is a contin-
uum of equilibrium trajectories converging to the same BGP wich is thus stable or
indeterminate.
However, in the present case, given that F (x) is an inverted U-shaped parabola, we
know that at the BGP equilibrium which corresponds to the second root of the poly-
nomial, F ′(x) < 0 such that the equilibrium is always indeterminate. In this case,
economies with similar fundamentals can save and grow at different rates during the
transition and will converge toward the same BGP in the long run.
3.6 The optimal solution
In the competitive case, the representative agent was taking average consumption
as given. We now turn to the problem faced by the social planner which can directly
influence average consumption and maximizes the discounted welfare function sub-
ject to the feasibility constraint. In this case, the discount rate θt =
∫ t
0 ρ(kτ , cτ )dτ
is still not constant. However, here we will use dynamic programming approach
to solve the problem since this will result in easier computations (notably for the
dynamics).
We define the value function
V (kt) = max
ct
U(ct, kt) (3.68)
subject to: {
k˙t = f(kt, ct)− ct − δkt
with k0 given
which leads to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
0 = max
ct
{
u(ct)− ρ(kt, ct)V (k) + V ′(kt)k˙
}
(3.69)
In order to obtain equation (3.69), we first write the value function in the initial
period as
V (k0) = max
ct
∫ t
0
u(cs)e
−
∫ s
0
ρ(kτ ,cτ )dτds+ V (kt) (3.70)
Taking the derivative of equation (3.70) with respect to t, making use of Leibniz’s
rule and the differentiability of the value function we obtain our Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation. From now on, we drop the time subscripts for convenience.
The first order necessary condition is
u′(c)− ρc(k, c)V (k) + V ′(k)(fc(k, c)− 1) = 0 (3.71)
while the second order sufficient condition is
u′′(c)− ρcc(k, c)V (k) + V ′(k)fcc(k, c) < 0 (3.72)
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Notice that the second-order condition is always satisfied if the discount function is
linear in consumption and the production function is concave in consumption.
Differentiating the Bellman equation with respect to k and using the enveloppe
theorem, we obtain
−ρk(k, c)V (k) + V ′′(k)k˙ + V ′(k)(fk(k, c)− δ − ρ(k, c)) = 0 (3.73)
To obtain the law of motion of consumption in the optimal case we differentiate
the first order condition with respect to time, use expression (3.73) and obtain the
following dynamical system:
c˙ =
(1− fc(k, c))[ρk(k, c)V (k)− V ′(k)(fk(k, c)− δ − ρ(k, c))]
u′′(c)− ρcc(k, c)V (k) + V ′(k)fcc(k, c) (3.74)
+
[ρck(k, c)V (k) + (ρc(k, c)− fck(k, c))V ′(k)]k˙
u′′(c)− ρcc(k, c)V (k) + V ′(k)fcc(k, c)
k˙ = f(k, c)− c− δk (3.75)
where V ′(k) = u′(c)− ρc(k, c)V (k)/(1− fc(k, c)).
The steady-state equilibrium is given by
fk(k, c)− δ − ρ(k, c) = ρk(k, c)u(c)(1− fc(k, c))
u′(c)ρ(k, c)− u(c)ρc(k, c) (3.76)
c = f(k, c)− δk (3.77)
The first steady-state equation is derived by using the value of V ′(k) and noting that
V (k) = u(c)/ρ(k, c) at the steady-state. We are now able to compare the steady-
state equations in the competitive and optimal case. We will restrict our attention
to the case of a unique steady-state but distinguish between fc−1 < 0 and fc−1 > 0.
Proposition 5.1:
Consider the case where fc−1 < 0, the steady-state optimal capital stock level k∗ is
higher than its equilibrium counterpart k if u(c∗)ρc(k∗, c∗) > u′(c∗)ρ(k∗, c∗)fc(k∗, c∗).
Consider the case where fc−1 > 0, the steady-state optimal capital stock level k∗ is
higher than its equilibrium counterpart k if u(c∗)ρc(k∗, c∗) < u′(c∗)ρ(k∗, c∗)fc(k∗, c∗).
Proof. We start with the first part of the proposition. From the optimal case, we
know that
δ = fk(k
∗, c∗)− ρ(k∗, c∗)− ρk(k
∗, c∗)u(c∗)(1− fc(k∗, c∗))
u′(c∗)ρ(k∗, c∗)− u(c∗)ρc(k∗, c∗) (3.78)
A direct implication of the previous equation is that
δ > fk(k
∗, c∗)− ρ(k∗, c∗)− ρk(k
∗, c∗)u(c∗)
u′(c∗)ρ(k∗, c∗)
(3.79)
if u(c∗)ρc(k∗, c∗) > u′(c∗)ρ(k∗, c∗)fc(k∗, c∗). We also know from the steady-state
equation of the competitive case that
δ = fk(k, c)− ρ(k, c)− ρk(k, c)
ρ(k, c)
u(c)
u′(c)
(3.80)
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If we differentiate equation (3.80) with respect to capital, we obtain our function
G′(k) from proposition 1. Remember that G′(k) < 0 in the case of a unique steady-
state. The implication is that k should be lower than k∗ in order to respect the equal-
ity between equations (3.78) and (3.80) if u(c∗)ρc(k∗, c∗) > u′(c∗)ρ(k∗, c∗)fc(k∗, c∗).
Concerning the second part of the proposition, we proceed in the same way except
that now
δ > fk(k
∗, c∗)− ρ(k∗, c∗)− ρk(k
∗, c∗)u(c∗)
u′(c∗)ρ(k∗, c∗)
(3.81)
if u(c∗)ρc(k∗, c∗) < u′(c∗)ρ(k∗, c∗)fc(k∗, c∗). This concludes the proof.
If the inequalities given in the previous proposition are satisfied, the representa-
tive agent does not save enough in order to reach the highest possible capital stock.
An intuitive policy would then be to subsidize investment. We will however see by
comparing first order conditions in both cases that this is not necessarly the end
of the story and that along an equilibrium growth path, it might be necessary to
subsidize consumption if production externalities are large. But first let’s focus on
the dynamic characteristics of the model in the optimal case. In order to do so,
we proceed as before and linearize the dynamical system around the steady-state
(c∗, k∗). (
c˙
k˙
)
=
(
∂c˙
∂c
∂c˙
∂k
∂k˙
∂c
∂k˙
∂k
) ∣∣∣∣
c˙=0,k˙=0
(
c− c∗
k − k∗
)
where
∂c˙
∂c
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = 0 (3.82)
∂c˙
∂k
|c˙=0,k˙=0 =
(fk − δ)[ρckV + (ρc − fck)V ′]
u′′ − ρccV + V ′fcc (3.83)
+
(1− fc)[ρkkV − V ′′(fk − δ − ρ)− V ′(fkk − 2ρk)]
u′′ − ρccV + V ′fcc
∂k˙
∂c
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = fc − 1 (3.84)
∂k˙
∂k
|c˙=0,k˙=0 = fk − δ (3.85)
As can be seen directly, the trace of the Jacobian matrix is always positive and
equal to fk−δ. The following proposition characterizes the dynamics at the optimal
solution.
Proposition 5.2:
Consider a steady-state of the planning economy, if
fkk <
ρkkV − (fk − δ − ρ)V ′′ + 2ρkV ′
V ′
(3.86)
− fk − δ
V ′(fc − 1)[ρckV + (ρc − fck)V
′]
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Then, the equilibrium is saddle-path stable and unstable otherwise.
Proof. First notice that Tr(J) = fk − δ > 0 such that the equilibrium can only be
saddle-path stable or unstable.
Concerning the determinant, we obtain
Det(J) = −(fc − 1)(fk − δ)[ρckV + (ρc − fck)V
′]
u′′ − ρccV + V ′fcc (3.87)
+
(fc − 1)2[ρkkV − V ′′(fk − δ − ρ)− V ′(fkk − 2ρk)]
u′′ − ρccV + V ′fcc
Saddle-path stability implies that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is nega-
tive. Since u′′ − ρccV + V ′fcc < 0 from the second order condition, the equilibrium
is saddle-path stable if
(fc − 1)(fc − 1)[ρkkV − V ′′(fk − δ − ρ)− V ′(fkk − 2ρk)]
−(fc − 1)(fk − δ)[ρckV + (ρc − fck)V ′] > 0 (3.88)
The previous expression is equivalent to expression (3.85) for both fc − 1 > 0 and
fc − 1 < 0.
This result imply that the inefficiency present in the competitive case can par-
tially be related to the possibility of facing local indeterminacies and endogenous
fluctuations (including limit cycles) since the optimal path is unique and character-
ized by monotic behavior. The presence of our two types of consumption externali-
ties thus entails a possible welfare loss in the competitive case.
As stated before, we will now compare the first order conditions in both situations in
order to highlight the differences between the competitive and the optimal outcome
and design a potential policy for the present case. In the competitive case, the first
order condition derived from dynamic programming is:
u′(c) = V ′(k) (3.89)
We can compare this last equation with the first order condition in the optimal
case given by equation (3.71). Let’s first assume that fc → 0 so that consumption
externalities in the production function are negligible. In this case, the first order
condition in the optimal case becomes:
u′(c)− ρc(k, c)V (k) = V ′(k) (3.90)
The marginal cost of a unit of consumption is higher due to the effect that con-
sumption exerts on the discount rate implying that agents don’t save enough in
the competitive case. The solution might then be to subsidize investment in order
to foster capital accumulation. In the case in which fc > 0, this observation is not
necessarily valid anymore. As we saw before, the first order condition in the optimal
case is given by:
u′(c)− ρc(k, c)V (k) + V ′(k)(fc(k, c)− 1) = 0
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This implies that the marginal cost of a unit of consumption is higher in the optimal
case if
ρc(k, c)V (k)− fc(c, k)V ′(k) > 0 (3.91)
and lower if the previous expression is negative. We can directly see that if fc is
sufficiently large, the expression is negative implying that consumption should be
subsidized given its positive impact on the production function. On the contrary,
if ρc is relatively large, the reverse is true and investment should be subsidized. As
argued by Drugeon (1998), it should be expected that production externalities are
stronger in developing countries where individual productivities can be more affected
by frequent deseases, a lack of health services or problems related to basic needs.
In this case, an adequate policy might be to subsidize consumption at low levels of
development and gradually move toward an investment subsidy or a consumption
tax policy as the economy becomes richer. A public intervention is thus necessary
given that the decentralized economy is unable to take advantage of large production
externalities at low levels of development while having a tendency to overconsume at
later stages of development. It is however necessary to stress some important points
concerning the implementation of the public policy. In our simplified model, the
presence of a unique consumption good does not allow to distinguish between goods
which might increase individual productivities and others that are not so effective
in doing so. A potential subsidy should only be directed toward consumption goods
which ensure large externalities in production. At low levels of development we can
think as before about goods related to health access or basic needs. A related ar-
gument can be made concerning the discount rate given that the goods sustaining
the jealousy effect might not be the same as the ones affecting the production func-
tion. The policy implementation might then be more complicated and costly than
what the model seems to suggest given that it is necessary to identify the specific
consumption goods that should be taxed or subsidized.
3.7 Conclusion
The present paper has extended the one sector neoclassical growth model by in-
troducing a discount rate decreasing in individual capital and average consumption
as an externality increasing both the discount rate and the production function.
By studying one externality at a time we have shown that the model without dis-
counting externalities and with large production externalities favors the existence
of a unique unstable steady-state. When only discounting externalities are taken
into account, we have shown that indeterminacy can only arise in the case of mul-
tiple steady-states and for even ones while large discounting externalities favor the
existence of a unique steady-state. The study of the full model with both type
of externalities however shows that the combination of large production and dis-
counting externalities is necessary in order to obtain a unique steady-state which is
indeterminate. Furthermore, we proved that the model is able to generate local bi-
furcations inducing the possible existence of limit-cycles as well as the possibility of
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a sudden economic take-off or depression. Concerning non-stationary environments,
we derived conditions compatible with the existence of a unique balanced growth
path which in the present framework is always indeterminate. We also established
that the differences between the competitive and the optimal outcome are driven by
two elements. First, the possibility of local indeterminacies and local bifurcations
which are ruled out in the optimal case entail a welfare loss in the competitive case.
Second, the competitive equilibrium can be characterized either by a too low or a
too high level of consumption depending on the magnitude of the external effects
implying the need of an appropriate policy intervention.
As expressed in the last part of the paper, further research could focus on multiple
consumption goods which don’t affect the discount rate and the production function
to the same extent.
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